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Economic analysis and rational choice have made significant inroads into the study
of international law and institutions in the last decade, relying upon standard
assumptions of perfect rationality of states and decisionmakers. This approach is
inadequate, both empirically and in its tendency toward outdated formulations of
political theory. This Article presents an alternative behavioral approach that
provides new hypotheses addressing problems in international law while
introducing empirically grounded concepts of real, observed rationality. First, I
address methodological objections to behavioral analysis of international law: the
focus of behavioral research on the individual, the empirical foundations of
behavioral economics, and behavioral analysis’s relative lack of parsimony. I then
offer indicative behavioral research frameworks for three contemporary puzzles in
international law: (a) the relative inefficiency of the development of international
law, (b) dissent in international tribunals, and (c) target selection in armed
conflict. Behavioral research in international law can serve as a viable, enriching
alternative and complement to conventional economic analysis, so long as it is
pursued with academic and empirical rigor as well as intellectual humility.
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INTRODUCTION: A NEW AND NECESSARY AGENDA
How can insights from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics
be meaningfully applied to international legal issues, in all their normative
and prescriptive dimensions? To understand the importance and potential
impact of this question, consider the following three contemporary puzzles,
each relating to different dimensions of international law.
First, when—and why—does international law fail to develop, even
when it is most needed? For four decades, global warming has been
proclaimed the most severe crisis humanity has ever faced that can only be
tackled through concerted international agreement and action.
Nevertheless, concrete and effective international norms, whether

2015]

Behavioral International Law

1101

customary or treaty-based, fail to materialize.1 Similarly, the rise of non-state
actors and transnational terrorism as well as new technologies of warfare
and intelligence have significantly altered the battlefield at home and
abroad, dramatically so since 9/11. Yet the applicable international law
remains a series of treaties (and their acceptance as customary law) whose
roots date back to the nineteenth century and whose latest editions are
from the 1970s.2 This is not to say that international law in these fields has
not adapted or developed at all, but why has it been so sluggish in these
areas of paramount concern when it has demonstrated the capacity to
develop quite meteorically with respect to other issues?3
Second, how should international courts be structured? In the last two
decades, there has been a momentous increase in the number and influence
of international courts and tribunals dealing with issues as varied as
international crimes and international trade. The structure of these courts
varies, as do their respective records of quality and effectiveness.4
Procedurally, some international courts allow dissenting opinions of judges,
while others require a high degree of consensus among judicial
decisionmakers coming from very different backgrounds. How have these
differences affected judicial outcomes? Do collegial international courts

1

For one account of this gap, see Tomer Broude, Warming to Crisis: The Climate Change Law of
Unintended Opportunity, 44 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 126 (2013), which offers a perspective on the
limiting effects the crisis framing of global warming has had on the development of international
law.
2
For overt struggles with this dissonance, see generally NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAW:
CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE (William C. Banks ed., 2011), and
International Conference, New Technologies, Old Law: Applying International Humanitarian Law in a
New Technological Age, HEBREW U. JERUSALEM (2011), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/eng/
merkazim.asp?cat=2355&in=2229, which explore the challenges to international humanitarian law
posed by non-state armed groups’ ability to exploit the shortcomings of stagnant legal
frameworks.
3
For example, the right to self-determination would have been virtually incomprehensible to
international lawyers in the late 1940s, but only twenty years later it had been elevated to the
highest degree of international normativity. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN HISTORY 178-79 (2010) (describing the years following World War II as “a
breakthrough period for human rights . . . [that] led international lawyers to reevaluate their longconfirmed positions” on the right to self-determination). In other areas, commentators have
argued that customary law can be created almost instantly through formally non-binding
resolutions of international institutions. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer
Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23, 24-25 (1965) (providing an
example of an international guidance resolution that was treated as binding).
4
See Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New
International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 79-80 (2009) (comparing new international courts
to the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice).
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stifle the development of international law? Or do fragmented benches
hinder it?5
Third, how should military attacks be conducted? Under international
humanitarian law, military commanders contemplating an armed attack
must follow a principle of proportionality, comparing the potential damage
to non-combatants with the military advantage gained from the attack.
What does this mean when viewed ex ante? How do reasonable, good faith
military commanders understand and execute this norm in practice? And
conversely, how should this practice affect the norm?6
Responses to all three questions, however different they may be from
each other, must rely on certain understandings, fundamentally descriptive
but often normative, of the ways in which states and other actors
interacting with international law (e.g., diplomats, judicial decisionmakers
in international tribunals, and military commanders) are expected to
behave. Over the last decade, many compelling analyses of similar
questions in international law have built on particular assumptions of what
may be termed “perfect” rationality: the growing area of economic analysis
of international law.7 In many other areas of law, however, the value of
applying rational choice theory to legal questions has been questioned and
contested by empirically grounded streams of behavioral economics and
cognitive psychology that focus on systematic divergences from perfect
rationality.8 Should these behavioral insights not now be avidly applied to
international law?
5

See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Dissent as Dialectic: Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2012) (arguing that “[t]oo much dissent can
undermine the legitimacy of a court”).
6
See Aaron Fellmeth, The Proportionality Principle in Operation: Methodological Limitations of
Empirical Research and the Need for Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 125, 133-35 (2012) (offering the
International Committee of the Red Cross study as an example of the divergence between “‘law
on the books’ and ‘law in action’” and illustrating the impact that the proportionality principle has
had on state attitudes).
7
Any bibliographical list would risk injury by omission. For a literature survey likening states
to individual rational actors, and hence treaties to contracts, see Alan O. Sykes, International Law,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 757, 771 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007). Important examples can be found in Symposium, Rational Choice and International Law, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2002), and in Symposium, Public International Law and Economics, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1. Central treatises on the topic are JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES,
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); and JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
8
See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000)
(“[I]ndividuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of rational
choice theory.”).
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Employed properly, a behavioral approach can contribute to
international legal research by raising interesting hypotheses relating to
problems in international law, and by providing frameworks for
experimental and empirical testing of these hypotheses, with both
explanatory and normative implications. A behavioral approach could be
seen as either augmenting or in some cases supplanting the now common
(one is almost tempted to say “traditional”) economic analyses of
international law. Indeed, in some cases, behavioral research can be useful
without any recourse to the framework of economic analysis. In any event,
behavioral analysis must be added to the international legal research
toolbox of alternative research methodologies, each of which should be
employed where it is illuminating and can be pursued with intellectual
honesty.
In making the case for behavioral analysis of international law, the
Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss some weaknesses of rational
choice and economic analysis of international law, primarily the limits of
assumptions of perfect rationality that are not backed by empirical
substantiation. In Part II, I briefly explain the corrective impact of
cognitive psychology on the economic analysis of law in general: its
understanding that human rationality is bounded, characterized by
systematic failures, shortcuts, and susceptibility to seemingly irrational
traits such as fairness, but also its descriptive and empirical strengths. This
is not to say that behavioral analysis is contrary to standard rational choice
but rather a complement and supplement. Part II also suggests what value
cognitive psychology might contribute to international legal research,
highlighting how few studies currently exist in this direction. In Part III, I
discuss and provide responses to what appear to be the central
methodological objections to the behavioral approach to international law:
(i) the focus of behavioral analysis on the individual, (ii) the empirical
foundations of behavioral economics, and (iii) its relative lack of parsimony.
Part IV offers indicative behavioral research frameworks for three issues in
international law: (i) the development of international treaty law, (ii) the
collegiality and dissent in international tribunals, and (iii) the target
selection in armed conflict. Finally, I recapitulate and offer some
concluding remarks on the potential role and viability of a behavioral
approach to international law.
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I. REVISITING THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL CHOICE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Are states and other international legal actors “rational” when they
interact with each other in the processes of making international law,
abiding by it, violating it, and enforcing it? A burgeoning, essential, and
predominantly American9 literature that uses rational choice tools in the
analysis of international law assumes that they are.10 The “law and
economics” (L&E) of international law has in the last decade made
significant inroads into the study of international law. It principally rests
upon assumptions of perfect rationality, whether of states or of
decisionmakers, that are determinative of state conduct in international law.
To be sure, social scientists engaged in the study of international
relations (IR) have used the same assumptions of rationality and employed
similar methods for more than half a century.11 For most of this time,
mainstream international legal scholarship has occupied the separate
methodological universes of doctrinaire positivism—“natural” law
9

The 2006 symposium on Public International Law and Economics held by the Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn is illuminating in this respect: all paperpresenters were from U.S. law schools, while the largely skeptical commentators were German;
the symposium contributions were subsequently published in a U.S. law journal. See Georg Nolte,
Public International Law and Economics: Concluding Remarks to the Bonn Conference, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 429. Indeed, the gap between American and European acceptance of economic analysis of
law was a subject of debate at the symposium. See id. at 429 (“[E]conomic analysis of law plays a
less prominent role in Europe than in the United States.”).
10
Assumptions as theoretical tools should not, however, be mistaken for claims about reality.
The old saw about economists stuck in a hole in the ground and assuming a ladder in order to
extract themselves amply demonstrates the difference. Nevertheless, both proponents and
opponents of rational choice too often blur this distinction. For a further analysis on the issue, see
infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
11
The “realist” school that launched the disciplinary study of IR in the late 1940s in a
Hobbesian tradition employed rudimentary concepts of rational choice by emphasizing the role of
national interest in the determination of state behavior and state sensitivity to incentives
presented by power relations. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3-17 (6th ed. 1985) (discussing the developments of the
realist school of international politics). Neoliberal IR theory built on the rationality of states and
added layers of strategic thinking to state behavior through the use of game theory. See, e.g.,
Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics (attributing the increasing popularity of
game theory to its application to international law), in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 25, 25
(Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); see also James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International
Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT’L ORG. 387, 388-89 (1994) (demonstrating how
game theory can help resolve the problems of sanctioning, monitoring, distribution, and
information commonly faced in international relations); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
923, 923-24 (1985) (classifying the challenges faced by international relations as collective-action
problems that can be explained through the application of game theory).
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idealization or intuitive “policy-oriented” prescriptiveness.12 For a variety
of reasons,13 international legal scholars turned their attention to the
implications of IR theory for international law only after the end of the
Cold War,14 to the point that today rational choice and economic analyses of
international law are very much in vogue.15 Contemporary international
lawyers who have not yet mastered the differences between the Prisoners’
Dilemma and Chicken16 or who lack a basic grasp of economic terminology
(utility functions, externalities, Pareto efficiency, transaction costs, Coasean
bargaining) jargon that was once, at most, the domain only of those who
dealt with international economic law,17 increasingly risk missing out on a
substantial body of cutting edge international law scholarship.18
12

For a non-critical but comprehensive survey of traditional doctrines of international law,
see MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-20 (5th ed. 2005).
13
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1999) (attributing international lawyers’ avoidance of L&E to its
“seemingly inaccessible methodologies,” “supposedly conservative political prejudices,” and
“presumed denigration of international law”).
14
See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 336 (1989) (“[O]verall, the discipline [of international law] has
fallen behind other fields of law in developing an analytical approach informed by social
science.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (1993) (comparing the view of international law as a
futile discipline in the 1960s to its recent effectiveness); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 367, 367-68 (1998) (acknowledging the recent proliferation of international relations
research). For current evaluations of the international relations/international law interface, see
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Law and International Relations: Introducing an
Interdisciplinary Dialogue, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 3, 3-27 ( Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack eds., 2013); and Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political
Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 51 (2012).
15
See, e.g., supra note 7.
16
These are two of many variants of collective-action problems analyzed through game
theory. For a succinct explanation, see TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 20-30
(2004). For a fascinating critique of the ubiquity of the Prisoners’ Dilemma attributing the
dominance of Prisoners’ Dilemma in political science research to path dependency, see Carol
Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369, 383 (2010).
17
It is hardly coincidental that many of the most path-breaking, prominent, and proficient
L&E scholars of international law, such as Ken Abbott, Andrew Guzman, Alan Sykes, Joel
Trachtman, and Michael Trebilcock, are also among the leading lights in international economic
law.
18
But see the fundamental critique of the influence of IR on international legal scholarship in
the United States in MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 3 (2001), which critiques the “conviction that
international reform could be derived from deep insights about society, history, human nature or
developmental laws of an international and institutional modernity,” and asserts that it has “failed
to produce or even support viable policies.” For a spirited response, see Mark A. Pollack, Is
International Relations Corrosive of International Law? A Reply to Martti Koskenniemi, 27 TEMP.
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The advent of economic analysis of international law is, in essence, the
fusion of two complementary trends. First, on the demand side, the
acknowledgement of the relative dearth of non-doctrinaire research
methodology and disciplinary rigor in international legal studies19 has led
some legal scholars to turn not only to IR theory, but more directly to
classical economic theory.20 Second, but of no lesser importance, on the
supply side, economic analysis of law has (in the United States and
elsewhere) significantly impacted virtually all fields of law and
jurisprudence, both in theory and in practice.21 For the disciples of L&E,
the application of its idiom to international law is simply another feather in
their collective caps.22
Rational choice analysis of international law thus satisfies both
international law’s quest for methodological decorum and the L&E school’s
ambitious mission of increased legal and social influence. Nonetheless, this
marriage—the rationalization of international law—has not been
harmonious, leading at times to disconcerting results. For many
international lawyers, economic analysis of international law, for all its
merits, will be forever tainted (and as a result, too easily ignored) because
of its association with the crude revisiting and rehearsal of the “realist”
claim that international law is not a system of law at all.23 This is
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 339, 340 (2013), where the author concludes that “Koskenniemi’s critique of
IR represents at best an anachronism, describing the early Cold War IR of our grandfathers
rather than the contemporary field, and at worst a distortion of IR scholars’ attitudes, aims, and
influence on the legal profession.”
19
See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law 97 (Univ.
of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 63, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=145972 (“Modern [customary international
law] scholarship occupies the position that domestic legal scholarship held a century ago. Heavy
reliance on cases and treatises gives scholars a distorted picture of actual state practices . . . .”); see
also Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A
Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 299 (1999) (noting that IR theory and L&E theory
claim to add rigor to international studies).
20
See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 50 (“[A]lmost every international law research
subject could be illuminated, to some degree, by [economic analysis] research methods.”).
21
See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Dean, Yale Law Sch., Remarks at the Second Driker Forum
for Excellence in the Law (Sept. 29, 1994) (presenting L&E as “the single most influential
jurisprudential school in this country”), in 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 (1995).
22
For example, Richard Posner, arguably the dean of the L&E school, devoted very little
attention to international legal issues in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
136-41 (6th ed. 2003), implying that international legal issues should be analyzed as any other
legal subject, by equating treaty law with domestic contract law with respect to the concept of
efficient breach.
23
See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1176-77 (1999) (suggesting a conservative rational choice formulation of
customary international law). But see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN
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unfortunate. The field has produced many contributions and responses,24
more rigorously based on economic theory and method. Many of these
contributions both effectively uphold the normative value of international
law and go a long way toward explaining its functions, or at least toward
presenting hypotheses to this end. There should be no doubt that rational
choice and L&E analyses have presented—and can continue to present—
many of the most enriching and challenging contributions to the ways we
reflect upon international law. Even if its introduction has produced
antagonism, the rational choice approach has much to offer, both positively
and normatively.
However, the gaps in the existing literature—such as the substantial
and substantive differences between studies ostensibly based upon the same
methodology—only highlight the susceptibility of economic analysis of law
to the political manipulation of assumptions and definitions. This risks
robbing it of its main self-professed strength: its scientific basis and
methodological parsimony. Moreover, even the most developed economic
analyses of international law are ultimately little more than shadows of
similar analyses generated by the neoliberal–institutionalist school of
international relations,25 an important earlier generation of knowledge, still
taught but now rarely practiced on its own.26 At times, such analyses have a
tendency to frame what should rightly be hypotheses about state behavior
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (7th ed. 1997) (referring to the booming
professional and academic work supporting international law and declaring “[t]he old discussion
on whether international law is true ‘law’ is therefore a moot point”). See generally Anne van
Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law,’ 17 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 289 (2006) (discussing L&E theory as developed by Posner and Goldsmith).
24
See generally GUZMAN, supra note 7 (describing rational choice and the general theory of
international law as they pertain to customary international law); TRACHTMAN, supra note 7
(describing customary international law).
25
See GUZMAN, supra note 7, at 33-34 (reducing the workings of international law to the
“three Rs” of reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation, which are remarkably reminiscent of the
repertoire of IR theory of earlier periods). See generally Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423 (2006) (discussing the effects of economic
theory as it applies to international law); see also TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 131-33 (describing
the use of game theory in generating international treaties).
26
Where in the recent past international relations studies could at least seem to be neatly
divided into paradigmatic “-isms”—realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism—it is increasingly
acknowledged that these schools share some common ground and, more importantly, that each
approach has its explanatory strengths and weaknesses, jointly constituting the international
relations “toolbox,” suggesting a dialectic rather than linear or paradigmatic pattern of progress.
See Mark Blyth, Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in
Political Science, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 695, 701-02 (2003) (arguing that “stark opposition and all-ornothing alternatives need not be the choice facing the discipline [of political science]”); see also
Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 14, at 37 (discussing the ongoing debate between realists and
constructivists).
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as question-begging assumptions instead. Interestingly, IR researchers are
cutting loose from the analytical strictures of perfect rational choice,27 while
at the very same time international legal scholars are beginning to discover
it. Legal research would do well to avoid rearguing intellectual debates now
all but settled in the IR discipline. Additionally, although it has generated
interesting hypotheses, L&E’s venture into international law has not been
backed up by a requisite level of empirical substantiation. Hypotheses are
advanced but rarely tested beyond the provision of anecdotal evidence
typical of informal L&E. In this respect, economic analysis of international
law can—and should—be salvaged by developing a more rigorous empirical
dimension. The generation of hypotheses is an important step in research,
but as Milton Friedman wrote, “the only relevant test of the validity of a
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”28
The most imperative of L&E’s assumptions is the assumption of
rationality of states and other actors under international law, which leads us
back to the question asked in opening: are states and other international
actors “rational?” We can make this question more precise and indeed more
interesting; instead of querying whether states are rational or not—there
seems to be no self-evident or other reason to presume that states are
inherently irrational29—the question ought to be: what is the nature of their
rationality? Studies employing rational choice in the analysis of
international legal problems and systems typically adhere to conventional
assumptions about human rationality and apply them en banc to states.30
Only rarely are these assumptions somehow qualified, for example
through the employment of “thin” rationality.31 Thin rationality is a
framework in which states would be deemed rational in their behavior,
27
See, e.g., Jonathan Mercer, Rationality and Psychology in International Politics, 59 INT’L ORG.
77, 79-80 (2005) (arguing that psychology complements rational choice because actors can exhibit
irrational behaviors); Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON.
REV. 657, 660-62 (2002) (arguing that rational choice is unrealistic and should be complemented
by psychology).
28
MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 8-9 (1966).
29
See Anne van Aaken, Towards Behavioral International Law and Economics: A Comment on
Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 47,
58 (asserting that “[f]ew international lawyers would deny that states . . . act in predominantly
rational ways”).
30
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579,
586 (2005) (assuming that “states are rational beings; that they act in their own self-interest, at
least as that interest is defined by the political leaders of the state; and that states are aware of the
impact of their actions on the behavior of other states”).
31
On “thin” rationality, see generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES
OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17-19
(1994).
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pursuing self-interest within a certain set of preferences, but it is
acknowledged that they set these preferences not by “objective” standards
of utility or efficiency, but rather idiosyncratically, in accordance with their
own emotional, cultural and historical charges “that many outsiders might
find difficult to understand.”32 Such a contextualization of state behavior
would appear obvious to traditional, regionalist, or otherwise specialist
scholars and analysts of international politics but it is an important
modifier to conservative economic analysis. Moreover, in the broader
context of international legal research, it stumbles upon the can of worms
of cultural relativism and erodes the paradigm of perfect rationality, making
it highly contingent on specific assumptions about individual state or
societal preferences and utility functions.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this; in IR, many explanations
“are no longer parsimonious.”33 Nevertheless, some rational choice analyses
of international law might also generally concede the possibility of
miscalculation by rational actors, though this is also not inconsistent with
traditional expected utility theory, as only decisions that are haphazard,
arbitrary, random, or otherwise a priori inutile are removed from the
model. The latter cases are symptoms of irrationality, not of qualified
rationality—divergences from perfect rationality are mistakes, not
behavioral patterns.
What, then, is wrong with the perfect rationality model of international
law and politics? Most clearly, it is empirically false; more accurately, it is
empirically unsubstantiated. So far, international L&E’s chief weakness lies
in its seeming reluctance to seriously test its hypotheses. In some cases,
these hypotheses might be factually valid, and hence, useful; however, they
usually remain hypotheses. As anywhere, with respect to international law,
L&E clearly needs to become more empirical and less theoretical, in which
case it could be brought into the fold of the so-called new legal realism (not
unlike the behavioral form of analysis discussed in this Article).34 However,
32
Russel Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road Map: A Negotiation Theory
Perspective on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict After Yasser Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2005).
33
Deborah Kay Elms, New Directions for IPE: Drawing from Behavioral Economics, 10 INT’L
STUD. REV. 239, 242 (2008). Parsimony is further discussed in Section III.C, infra.
34
See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 296 (2001)
(book review) (arguing that behavioral law and economic theory is as limited as pure rationality
theory); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 71-90 (2009) (discussing the various
forms of new legal realism); Gregory Shaffer, A New Legal Realism: Method in International
Economic Law Scholarship (emphasizing the importance of field work in legal realism), in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 29, 39
(Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2008).
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a standard defense against this claim is that rationality is not intended to
depict reality. It is a model—no more, no less.35 Nevertheless, international
L&E scholars rarely test their theories, yet often make significant claims
about reality. Furthermore, some economic analysis, even if it is formally
hypothetical and descriptive, includes a disguised or otherwise embedded
normative element. Implicit in the assumptions of individual (or state)
rationality is the view that individuals or states are and should be (perfectly)
rational, and this is no longer a model, but a positive or normative claim.
Beyond international L&E, however, studies of rationality have
evolved into the gradual establishment of a behavioral school of economics
that challenges basic assumptions of human rational choice, judgment, and
decisionmaking with alternative, empirically based observations on
cognitive psychology. Recently, these have been greatly popularized36 and,
for better or for worse, cannot be ignored in current public policy debates.
Would it not be possible and potentially productive to turn to these insights
“to bring new and more accurate understandings of behavior and choice to
bear”37 on international law, subject to standard methodological
qualifications and controls? Cognitive psychology has led to analyses of
domestic legal systems and arrangements; it has also led to non-legal
behavioral studies in IR, indeed with a long, if not dominant, scholarly
tradition (especially in security studies).38 These efforts are certainly not
without their failures and flaws, but conceptually, they hold great potential,
and it would be analytically and discursively productive to now explicitly
merge them into the idea of behavioral international law, as explained in
the following Part.39
35
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004) (“The
advantage of studying models is that they allow descriptive and normative questions to be
answered in an unambiguous way . . . .”). The emphasis is, therefore, on parsimony, rather than
empirical accuracy.
36
See generally, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
37
Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
38
See, e.g., ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 117-201 (1976) (discussing the effects of rational and irrational actions in psychological
theories as they pertain to international decisionmaking); YAACOV Y. I. VERTZBERGER, RISK
TAKING AND DECISIONMAKING: FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS 43-112 (1998)
(using socioeconomic factors to discuss how people evaluate risks). See generally Jack S. Levy,
Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems, 13 POL.
PSYCHOL. 283 (1992) (discussing the evaluation of international relations under prospect theory).
39
Indeed, the idea of behavioral international law research flows naturally from the
problematique of nonempirical, rational choice approaches to international law. See generally van
Aaken, supra note 29 (offering several new methods of utilizing social science in international legal
analysis).
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Before moving into a more detailed explanation of the implications of
behavioral economics for international law, it is important to at least briefly
note other well-developed critiques and sophisticated alternatives to the
standard rational choice approach. Given the limitations of rational choice
methods in international law, some have pursued paths of social
constructivism and sociology of law by explaining state behavior in
sociological terms.40 Moreover, one can seek out the ways in which the
rationality of individuals, as well as collectives, is socially constructed by
economic theory through an examination of studies in the field of economic
sociology.41 The interaction between such sociological approaches and the
use of insights from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology is
complex and multileveled. For example, in their important work on
acculturation and socialization in international law, Ryan Goodman and
Derek Jinks refer not only to social pressures to conform, but also to
cognitive pressures.42 They deal with cognitive features as part of the
environment in which organizations, such as states, act.43 And of course,
40

See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade
Organization, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 321, 334-53 (2012) (proposing a sociological framework to
understand and improve operations of the World Trade Organization since rationalism overlooks
vital social dimensions of the organization and leaves theoretical gaps); Moshe Hirsch, The
Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of Regional Agreements
in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277, 288 (2008) (describing how the social
constructivist approach posits that states’ interests and identities are constructed by social
structures and acknowledges that states are embedded in a set of social relations where their
identity is defined by their interaction with other international actors); see also Moshe Hirsch, The
Sociology of International Law: Invitation to Study International Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 891, 892 (2005) (discussing how recently international law scholars have used
sociology to study international legal concepts, which has redefined international law and our
understanding of its social limits).
41
See Michel Callon, An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by
Sociology (describing the impact that sociological accounts of externalities may have in
negotiations, helping us understand the dynamics of markets and their reforms), in THE LAWS
OF THE MARKETS 244, 264-66 (Michel Callon ed., 1998); Neil Fligstein, The Political and
Economic Sociology of International Economic Agreements (discussing how economic sociology offers
insights into understanding the structure of global markets), in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY 183, 201 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005). I am grateful to
Andrew Lang for pointing out this direction of inquiry, which has potentially interesting
interactions with behavioral economics.
42
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 684 (2004) (“[C]ognitive pressures suggest that states may
be more inclined to conform their behavior to community expectations—and that they are
unlikely to sustain, over the long term, an idiosyncratic interpretation of any norm that the
international community considers central.”); infra Section IV.B (returning to cognitive pressures
to conform in the context of international judging).
43
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1749, 1755-56 (2003) (studying how the cognitive environment guides state actors by
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behavioral research and sociological scholarship share a heightened
appreciation and requirement for empirical grounding. In short, there is
still much to explore about the intellectual and methodological pathways
that run between sociological approaches and psychological research
methods in international law.44 My focus here is on the development of the
latter.
II. WHY BEHAVIORAL INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Despite the apparent primacy of classical or traditional rational choice
theory in international legal scholarship, contemporary formulations of
rationality are far from monolithic. Traditional L&E employs classical
theoretical economic assumptions of perfect human rationality. It assumes
that under conditions of resource scarcity, human beings act as utilitymaximizing, self-interested beings that respond to incentives in accordance
with stable preference priorities.45 These assumptions enable L&E scholars
to discuss and analyze the ramifications of such rational behavior for the
design and effectiveness of law and legal institutions, both market- and
nonmarket-oriented. But where traditional L&E adheres to objective
conceptions of ideal rationality personified in a hypothetical “homo
economicus,”46 and international L&E imagines a “civitas economica,”
behavioral L&E seeks to incorporate insights from empirical research in
the field of cognitive psychology regarding human rationality as it is
observed in reality and practice. Experimental research has shown that in
many cases human behavior diverges from theoretical assumptions about
rationality; consequently, “[t]he task of behavioral law and economics,
simply stated, is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized)
structuring the field of possible action and the ways states inherit and satisfy specific
expectations).
44
Indeed, it is not surprising that some of the very first research on international law
employing behavioral insights was brought forward by sociological scholars. See Paul Slovic,
David Zionts, Andrew K. Woods, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Psychic Numbing and Mass
Atrocity (discussing possible ways to overcome “psychic numbing,” or turning off emotions in the
face of mass atrocities, to mobilize global public sentiment and changes in international law), in
THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126, 136 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
45
See Guzman, supra note 30, at 586 (assuming that states are rational beings acting in their
own self-interest); see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (“[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of
information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”).
46
For the development of the term, see Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo
Economicus, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 230 (1995), which explains that the “economic man” is useful
not to indicate that humans are rational, but that social science works best when its findings are
limited by imposing some basic assumptions.
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human behavior for the law.”47 After a few decades of significant
experimental research by cognitive psychologists on human
decisionmaking, it is well-acknowledged that, in many ways, human
individuals are decidedly not rational in the ideal sense. Human action is
not only “shaped by relevant economic constraints but is highly affected by
people’s endogenous preferences, knowledge, skills, endowments, and a
variety of psychological and physical constraints.”48
A behavioral–economic approach to law supplants the basic
assumptions of rationality with several qualified statements on human
decisionmaking, based on experimental observations of human behavior.49
Like classic economic rationality, behavioral economics is first and foremost
a theory of judgment. The former emphasizes models based upon objective
methods of utility maximization. The latter, similarly, embraces the
importance of autonomous decisionmaking, but strives to understand how
it plays out in reality. Behavioral economics varies by taking into account
the real boundaries and attributes of human character and capacities.
Indeed, for the reasons noted above, perfect rationality is a theory of
judgment that also includes elements of a normative theory. In contrast,
behavioral theory has a very strong empirical, descriptive element. This is
not to say that it cannot provide the basis for normative analysis. Of course
it can; understanding how actors—states or individuals—behave in practice
is a crucial element in designing rules with the instrumental intention of
influencing this behavior.50 Indeed, advocates of the behavioral approach to

47
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 13, 14.
48
Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith, Introduction to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1-2 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
49
This does not mean, however, that the rational choice framework of analysis is entirely
rejected. As Thomas S. Ulen and Russell B. Korobkin stated:
[W]e do not argue that the edifice of rational choice theory, which underlies so much of
legal scholarship, be ripped down. Rather, we suggest that it be revised, paying heed to
important flaws in its structure that unduly and unnecessarily limit the development of a
more nuanced understanding of how law affects society.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1144.
In other words, other central tenets of economic analysis of law—especially the idea that
actors respond to incentives that the law creates or influences—are retained. For a purist response,
implying that the rational choice framework and the assumption of rationality are a package deal,
see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1567 (1998). Posner explains that even when faced with anomalous behavior, the rational choice
economist will look for a theoretical modification that might accommodate an apparent anomaly
to the assumption of rationality. Id.
50
See Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law (“A large body of evidence, now
familiar to the legal community, demonstrates that individual judgment and choice is often driven
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law consider it to be both normatively neutral, because it is not necessarily
wedded to welfare economic analysis, and normatively relevant, because of
its ability to point to systematic decision errors that reduce the capacity of
the law to promote social welfare.51
Simplified, the central concept underlying the study of behavioral
theory is the idea of bounded rationality, which recognizes that human
cognitive capabilities are not perfect or infinite.52 The human brain makes
shortcuts in judgment and decisionmaking that diverge from expected
utility theory. Limiting aspects of bounded rationality and the shortcuts
taken to overcome them—generally known as biases and heuristics,
respectively—inevitably cause human decisions that appear erroneous when
compared with perfectly rational outcomes. Having said this, it is
important to understand that behavioral economics does not aspire to
replace one ideal-type decisionmaker (a perfectly rational one) with another
(rationally imperfect) decisionmaker. Rather, the behavioral research
agenda aims to explore the characteristics of the real decisionmaking
processes of different types of actors under different circumstances. So far,
various important generalizable characteristics have been identified, but
behavioralists do not claim that they exist equally among all decisionmakers
in all cases and under all conditions.
Momentarily setting this caveat of contingency aside, perhaps the
single most important insight of behavioral psychology discovered through
economic analysis derives from prospect theory.53 Prospect theory questions
by heuristic-based reasoning as opposed to the pure optimization approach presumed by rational
choice theory.”), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 45, 45 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006).
51
See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237,
314-25 (2008) (describing how “the behavioral analysis of law is simultaneously normatively
neutral and normatively relevant[,] . . . normatively neutral because it is not committed to any
specific legal goal or value” and normatively relevant because it provides a tool to look at the
impact of systematic decision errors on social welfare).
52
Though not in name, the concept of bounded rationality was first introduced into academic
discourse by Herbert Simon in A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. See Herbert A. Simon, A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 114 (1955) (suggesting the replacement of
“economic man” with “a choosing organism of limited knowledge and ability” whose
“simplifications of the real world for purposes of choice introduce discrepancies between the
simplified model and the reality”). For a collection of studies on the topic, see generally
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001).
While the notion of boundedness implies a limitation of rationality, some of the literature views it
as enabling effective decisionmaking. See MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 87 (2011)
(noting that economists who speak of “bounded rationality” may “fail to account adequately for
the fact that the best way of solving many problems . . . is to use a scaled-back computational
method”).
53
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979) (presenting an alternative account of individual
decisionmaking under risk for simple prospects with monetary outcomes and stated probabilities
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the validity of the Coase theorem, which both expresses and relies upon the
idea of perfect rationality. In Coasean economics, in the absence of
transaction costs, the initial assignment of resources or entitlements is not
determinative of their ultimate allocation. Cost–benefit bargaining between
rational actors will assign the entitlements efficiently to the actor who
values them the most, regardless of the starting point.54 The Coase theorem
is elemental for classical economic analysis of the law because it neutralizes
the psychological aspects of human interactions. Indeed, it is the basis of
L&E’s overarching parsimony. However, experimental observations have
shown repeatedly, in varying circumstances, that initial assignments of
entitlements do matter. Initial assignments significantly influence actors’
decisions, in particular, their willingness to part with their entitlements. In
Coasean terms, $10 (or any other item of value—in international affairs this
could be territory, resources, or any other asset of political or symbolic
importance) has equal worth, whether gained or lost, whether compared to
rags or to riches. Yet in real life, people do not regard losses and gains of
equal size indifferently. For example, they will often invest more in the
prevention of loss than in the generation of gains of the same amount. This
is the logic that underlies a variety of related terms that derive or are
otherwise related to the ideas of prospect theory, such as loss aversion,55 the
endowment effect,56 and framing effects.57
that “distinguishes two phases in the choice process: an early phase of editing and a subsequent
phase of evaluation”).
54
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960) (illustrating how a
farmer and a cattle raiser bargain differently over damage liability for a straying cattle that
destroys crops based on the cost of crops and cattle and what is most efficient for each actor).
55
For the most comprehensive and thought-provoking study of loss aversion in legal contexts,
see Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 830 (2012), where the author
theorizes that “[g]ains and losses are defined relative to a baseline or reference point. The value
function is normally steeper for losses than gains, indicating loss aversion.” See also EYAL ZAMIR,
LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 1-2 (2015) (explaining
that “people’s preferences and choices are a function not only of the expected value of different
outcomes, but also of their risk aversion, which in turn depends on their overall assets” and that
gains and losses are defined in relation to a reference point making the value function for losses
convex, or people more likely to accept a smaller gain just to avoid a potential larger loss).
56
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990) (positing that the
endowment effect, described as “measures of willingness to accept greatly exceed[ing] measures of
willingness to pay,” persists in market settings); id. at 1326 (citing a hypothesis that many
discrepancies between willingness to accept and willingness to pay “reflect a genuine effect of
reference positions on preferences” and the endowment effect is this “increased value of a good to
an individual when the good becomes part of the individual’s endowment”); see also Russell
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law (describing how the
endowment effect is also related to the phenomenon known as “status quo bias”), in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 116.
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Prospect theory and the various phenomena it informs present a
fundamental diversion from perfect rationality. If law—including
international law—has the aim of directing the behavior of actors—
including states and other actors engaged with international law—it must
take prospect theory into account, at least in instances where it can
empirically be shown to have a significant impact.
There are additional psychological kinks in rationality, systematically
substantiated by scientific experiments in cognitive psychology. For
example, under the availability bias, “[p]eople tend to think that risks are
more serious when an incident is readily called to mind.”58 Under the
so-called hindsight bias, people tend to overestimate ex ante predictions
they had made “concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurring after
learning that it actually did occur.”59 Probability matching is a proven
tendency of human subjects to make choices that match the relative
frequency of events, instead of utility-maximizing choices that would
presuppose the occurrence of the most probable (e.g., when faced with a
six-sided die with four red sides and two white sides and asked to
repeatedly guess the color that would be rolled, people choose red twothirds of the time, instead of the utility-maximizing solution that would
choose red every time).60
Like prospect theory, availability bias, hindsight bias, probability
matching, and other biases and heuristics hold important lessons for the
design of law and legal process in a variety of areas. For example, it has
57
Framing effects arise when alternative descriptions of the same decision problem give rise
to different preferences. Thus, in one classic example, people who have lost $10 on the way to the
theater will tend to nonetheless purchase a ticket; but people who have lost a pre-purchased ticket
to the theater worth $10 will not, even though in expected utility terms, the rational decision
should be the same. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457 (1981) (providing the ticket example to illustrate how an
existing account affects a decision); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S255-62 (1986) (providing additional examples of framing
effects that control the representation of options and explain invariance).
58
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 5.
59
Thomas S. Ulen, Human Fallibility and the Forms of the Law: The Case of Traffic Safety, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 48, at 397, 410; see also
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 298
(1975) (“Judges may estimate the likelihood of a reported outcome by initially assigning it
100%, . . . then looking for reasons to adjust downward from there. Adjustment from initial values
is typically inadequate and would produce creeping determinism . . . .”).
60
See Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich, Is Probability Matching Smart? Associations
Between Probabilistic Choices and Cognitive Ability, 31 MEMORY & COGNITION 243, 244 (2003)
(providing the die example and its heuristic results as demonstrative of probability matching
responses when the frequencies of hypothetical outcomes are inferable from the outset).
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been argued that availability bias, compounded by social and political
processes, makes risk regulators vulnerable to inefficient decisions;61 and
hindsight bias operating in conjunction with other biases prevent increased
driver tort liability from reducing traffic accidents.62 Others have argued
that probability matching supports employing a risk-based rather than a
harm-based liability scheme in tort law, inducing individuals to behave
more like maximizers than probability matchers.63 Similar lessons surely
exist for international law.
These expressions of bounded rationality show that in many situations,
individuals are incapable of rational utility-maximization because of the
way the human mind processes information and reacts to particular
circumstances. In many cases, heuristics can be effective in reducing costs
of decisionmaking. But at the same time, they may also lead to systematic
and repeated errors. In addition to bounded rationality, cognitive
psychology has shown that individuals may have only bounded willpower.64
This concept significantly undermines the premises of classical rational
choice. People sometimes act against their own interests, even when fully
informed and conscious of the damage they may be inflicting upon
themselves. The classic example is habitual smokers who do not kick the
habit, even if they declare that they would like to. While this may be
attributable to substance addiction, behaviorists have shown that bounded
willpower is influential in other areas that are relevant to law, such as lack
of self-control in criminal behavior.65
Finally, to complete the picture, in contrast to rational choice’s
assumptions of self-interest, people sometimes deliberately act contrary to
61
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 746 (1999) (“[A]vailability cascades constitute a major, perhaps the leading, source of
the risk-related scares that have cramped federal regulatory policy at both the legislative and
executives levels . . . . [C]ascades force governments to adopt expensive measures without careful
consideration of the facts.”).
62
See Ulen, supra note 59, at 414 (describing how “the presence of the hindsight bias suggests
that tort law may not work as well as rational choice theory had hoped to create incentives to take
care” because there may be nothing that manufacturers or drivers can do to avoid liability if an
accident occurs and juries assume they are liable).
63
See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of
Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005) (“[P]robability matching shows the
advantages of using a risk-based liability system (imposing costs on the creation of risks) rather
than the use of a harm-based liability system (imposing costs only for the creation of risks that
materialize in harm).”).
64
See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 15.
65
See, e.g., James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 368-71
(1992) (analyzing criminal earnings per day in prison and suggesting that criminals’ opportunism
and focus on the present (i.e., discounting future costs of punishment) leads them to decisions
that can render classical deterrence inefficient).
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their own interests in the name of fairness, to benefit others. Evidently, in
many cases, the human utility function includes values relating to the
utility of others. This aspect of human behavior is sometimes referred to as
“bounded self-interest.”66 The calculus of fairness in actual rationality also
includes the expectation of fair treatment from others.67 Both of these
aspects of fairness consideration can be demonstrated through consistent
experimental results in “ultimatum games,” in which subjects regularly
make offers and responses that diverge from the rational economic
prediction.68 These results are preserved even when agents do not know
each other and possible reputational effects or social contexts are controlled
for, suggesting that fairness is not (only) a social phenomenon but one that
is embedded in human rationality.69
Behavioral theory should not necessarily be seen as contradictory to
rational choice; in many ways it supplements and completes it.70 But these
experimental findings have suggested significant qualifications to rational
choice–based social analyses and hold important implications for the L&E
description and prescription of law.71 This nutshell explanation of
behavioral economics and its effects on rational analysis of law is neither
novel nor exhaustive. It is furnished here mainly to inform the question
whether behavioral analysis could make a difference to international legal
scholarship. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that the rationality of
states and other international actors, or at least of those individuals and
groups who determine state behavior is also “bounded,” that biases and
heuristics impact their choices and decisions, then the answer to this
question is undoubtedly positive. In essence, any area of international law
that can be explained or analyzed in terms of rational choice—humanitarian
law, trade law, environmental law, arms control, migration law, or more general
aspects of international law such as treaty-making or adjudication—could
66

See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 16.
See Elms, supra note 33, at 255 (describing concerns of fairness to others in the behavior of
individuals).
68
For a detailed description, see Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 21-26.
69
But see generally Barbara A. Mellers et al., Group Report: Effects of Emotions and Social
Processes on Bounded Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 52, at 263, and Joseph
Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY, supra note 52, at 343, for a discussion of the role of society and culture in the
development of behavioral biases and heuristics.
70
Whether behavioral L&E challenges or rather complements traditional L&E is a question
discussed in Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 48.
71
Conservative L&E remains unmoved by these findings because “the concept of rationality
used by the economist is objective rather than subjective, so that it would not be a solecism to
speak of a rational frog.” See POSNER, supra note 22, at 17.
67
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benefit from the incorporation of behavioral economics, and some examples
will be suggested later in this Article. Strikingly, however, despite the great
potential that behavioral analysis holds for these areas of cardinal
importance, one hardly finds recourse to behavioral science in international
legal literature, L&E, or otherwise.72 The scarcity of behavioral research on
international legal issues is evident even in the increasing literature on
international risk regulation, which is a prime area for behavioral study.73
Even leading scholars with a keen interest and high degree of
proficiency in behavioral analysis of domestic law seem to refrain from
applying behavioral insights when engaging in questions of international
law. For example, in a lucid negotiation-theory analysis of the ongoing
impasse in Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, Korobkin and Zasloff have
employed a rational choice negotiation framework that allows for

72
First swallows have appeared, however. For discussions of applications to international
humanitarian law, see Tomer Broude, Presentations at the Minerva Center for Human Rights
Conference on Proportionality in Armed Conflict, Jerusalem: Behavioral Framing Effects and
Proportionality in IHL (Nov. 2010), available at http://prezi.com/ayfsnphh5i3h/framing-ihl. See
also Ashley Deeks, Cognitive Biases and Proportionality Decisions: A First Look (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/6_AshleyDeeks_p.pdf. For an analysis of the
psychological causes for lack of affect toward genocide and mass atrocities, with operative
recommendations in the areas of human rights and international institutions, see Slovic et al.,
supra note 44, at 136. For an application of the availability bias to bilateral investment treatymaking, see generally Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273 (2013); Lauge N.
Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L
STUD. Q. 1 (2014); and Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Letting Down the Guard: Developing
Countries, Investment Treaties, and Bounded Rationality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). Two recent contributions take very different, but equally stimulating, behavioral–
empirical approaches to treaty formation. See generally Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a
Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 309 (2013) (employing database
research to analyze the role of treaty reservations); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Decision
Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation, INT’L ORG. (forthcoming 2014) (using surveybased research to analyze the influence of behavioral traits of key treaty negotiators on treaty
formation). More general contributions include Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and
Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Anne van Aaken & Tomer Broude, Behavioral
Economic Analysis of International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming 2015); and ANNE VAN AAKEN &
TOMER BROUDE, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2016).
73
But for notable exceptions, see David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003); Tracey Epps, Reconciling Public Opinion and
WTO Rules under the SPS Agreement, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 359 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Markus Wagner, Law Talk V. Science
Talk: The Languages of Law and Science in WTO Proceedings, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151 (2011);
and Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific
Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459 (2006).
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miscalculation firmly within the “expected utility” tradition.74 They do not,
however, discuss the potential insights of behavioral theory in the Israeli–
Palestinian context—even though Korobkin has separately addressed the
role that heuristics and biases play in bargaining more generally, and how
the acknowledgement of their existence can help negotiators either adjust
their own decisions in order to reach normative results or take advantage of
their counterparts in maximizing the terms negotiated.75 These behavioral
insights, if applied to the Israeli–Palestinian context, are non-trivial.
Consider, for example, the possible role of overconfidence and hindsight
bias in both Israeli and Palestinian positions in general; or of the fairness
bias in the meltdown of the Camp David talks in 2000, in particular, which
could be analyzed as an ultimatum game; or the influence of endowment
effects evident in Israel’s entrenched occupation and settlement policy on
its negotiating positions; or the impact of the availability bias as triggered
by recurring terrorist attacks on Israeli risk assessments that have informed
its security policies in the occupied territories as well as its negotiating
positions. These frameworks of analysis are not pursued in this Article—
they are only mentioned here to demonstrate the hesitation of behavioral
legal analysts to apply their knowledge about human decisionmaking to
international legal affairs.
Why is there such reticence, to say the least, to apply behavioral theory
to international law? The reasons themselves may be behavioral, but that is
beside the point. The question is whether there are any methodological
justifications for refraining from doing so. I now turn to discuss a number
of particular obstacles or objections to the application of behavioral
economics to international law, which have perhaps so far chilled the advent
of this project.

74

See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 32, at 9 (assuming that Israel and Palestine engage in
rational behavior when making decisions or taking actions).
75
See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2004). Another scholar who has applied behavioral economics to
domestic legal issues, but standard traditional choice to international law, is Francesco Parisi.
Compare Parisi & Smith, supra note 48, at 9 (recognizing the “mainstreaming of behavioral theory
and the ongoing process of incorporation of psychological findings in the process of economic
modeling), with Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of
Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4-13 (2003) (applying game
theory principles to understand states’ reservations to treaties). Treaty reservations are indeed a
prime area for behavioral research, as demonstrated by Galbraith, supra note 72.
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III. OBJECTIONS TO BEHAVIORAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSES
One can raise several theoretical and methodological objections to a
behavioral approach to international law. First, cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics relate primarily to the conduct of individuals as
(obviously) unitary actors, while the main subjects of international law are
collective entities, primarily states. Second, the main strength of the claims
made by cognitive psychology regarding rationality and decisionmaking is
its grounding in empirical observations derived from experiments made
with human subjects, which are difficult and perhaps impossible to replicate
meaningfully in the context of international law and international relations.
Third, the parsimony of traditional rational choice analyses of international
interactions is superior to that of bounded rationality, although the latter
adds layered and contingent dynamics to otherwise more straightforward
hypothetical mechanics. These are all legitimate objections. Notably, they
could be voiced from practically all corners—by realists, traditional
rationalists, behavioralists, and non-rationalists, albeit all for different
reasons. However, there are good responses to each objection, as explained
below, and the objections themselves are not sufficient to reject the project.
Rather, they must be considered in the design of research methodologies
that incorporate behavioral insights into the analysis of international law. I
will deal with them in the order of their importance.
A. The Individual Focus of Behavioral Theory
Under this objection, a behavioral approach to international law would
be faulted if it examined the conduct of states because it would ostensibly
be making a leap of faith from the methodological individualism76 on which
behavioral theory and research are premised, to methodological statism.77
Put differently, states as constructed legal personalities do not necessarily
76

The term is used here loosely to refer to cognitive psychology’s focus on the individual,
without any statement about the theoretical framing of the relationship between the individual
and society in the social sciences. For a comprehensive survey and discussion of this grand debate,
see generally LARS UDEHN, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: BACKGROUND, HISTORY
AND MEANING (2001).
77
See, for example, the objection to the application of prospect theory to decisionmaking of
states, in Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective, 13 POL.
PSYCHOL. 311, 313-14 (1992). Notwithstanding the objection, for such theoretical applications in
specific international contexts, see, for example, Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and
Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 179,
180 (1996), and Rose McDermott, Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage
Rescue Mission, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 237, 245-52 (1992), both of which apply prospect theory to state
leaders and small decisionmaking groups, rather than to states as unitary actors.
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share the imperfections of individuals or, by some accounts, necessarily do
not. There are at least three responses to this criticism, each with its own
methodological consequences, corresponding to three levels of analysis: (1)
the state as a unitary actor; (2) decisionmaking collectives in international
law; and (3) the individual as a decisionmaker in international law.
1. The State as a Unitary Actor?
This is perhaps the most difficult of the objections, but ultimately, it
does not hold. First, quite bluntly, to the extent that this objection was
voiced from the traditional quarters of realists, L&E analysts, and
international lawyers, the initial response should be to note the hypocrisy of
the criticism. All of these traditional groups have tended to do exactly the
same, equating states to individual agents and considering the state as a
usually unitary actor and decisionmaker. Is there any reason, however, to
suppose—or any substantiation to that effect—that states, even when seen
as black boxes or billiard balls (i.e., without looking into their internal
decisionmaking processes) are any more perfectly rational than individuals?
If the general rules of human behavior are better captured by the concept of
bounded rationality, the validity of an assumption that states conduct
themselves within the dictates of perfect rationality would be an exception
to that rule. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that states are less
rational because decisions are made by both agents and collectives. The
empirical burden of proving the validity of a decisionmaking theory may
therefore rest not upon a loose behavioral approach, but rather upon
traditional rationalist analyses whose assumptions are stricter. These would
then have to explain how states overcome the bounded rationality of the
individuals that compose them and perfect their own rationality. Generally,
there are two ways to do this: by looking beyond the state and by looking
within the state.
Looking beyond the state, the argument against applying behavioral
economic analysis to states would be that even if states naturally acted
according to bounded rather than ideal rationality, the international
political and legal environment in which states act would somehow have a
corrective effect, leading them to become more perfectly rational. Put
differently, the costs associated with behaving in imperfectly rational ways
would lead states to adjust their behavior accordingly. Notably, a similar
debate has arisen with respect to the rationality of another type of nonindividual, collective legal actor: the firm. Traditional economic analysts of
law have claimed that selection effects in market contexts will discipline
bounded rational behavior in firms, rendering empirical insights about
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individual behavior immaterial.78 Indeed, some proponents of behavioral
analysis have conceded this as a valid point.79 With respect to states, this is
certainly an important issue, but it should be viewed as an impetus to
perform behavioral research of international law, requiring empirical
inquiries into the degree to which state behavior in discrete situations
conforms to expected rational benchmarks, rather than as an obstacle.
Indeed, in many—arguably, most—situations relating to international
law, states operate in a noneconomic market environment, making the
selection argument less relevant. Moreover, the application of selection
effects to states is difficult, because in contrast to firms, states are never
formally eliminated from international relations and do not incur losses in
the same way that firms might be pushed out of the market—states can fail,
but they do not liquidate.80 Finally, even with respect to firms active in
economic market contexts, empirical behavioral research has shown that
while competitive forces do tend to eliminate some boundedly rational
firms, they also “inevitably select some other such actors for success,” to the
point that firms that are imperfectly rational in their behavior even become
overrepresented among surviving and successful corporations.81
Subject to empirical research on this issue, it would appear that the
same might apply as a plausible hypothesis relating to states (i.e., that
states do not become more perfectly rational, but rather maintain a degree
of boundedness despite the external competitiveness).82 But in any case,
78

Posner, supra note 49, at 1570-71.
Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1758 (1998) (conceding that “everyone has problems with intertemporal choice”). But see
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law (suggesting a number of strategies
to overcome the problems of applying individual biases to a business setting), in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442, 443-45 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell eds., 2012).
80
There are a few exceptions. For example, in 1934, the self-governing status of the British
Dominion of Newfoundland was suspended due to economic crisis and its inability to pay interest
charges on its national debt and replaced by a Commission of Government composed of nonelected civil servants; in 1949, Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation. See David
Mackenzie, Canada, The North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire, in 4 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 574, 589-92 ( Judith M. Brown & Wm.
Roger Louis eds., 1999). However, this likely was not caused by a particular form of rationality in
the Dominion’s conduct.
81
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy,
101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 485 (2002).
82
One important stream of behavioral writing adopts an organizational approach, taking
bounded rationality as a significant environmental factor in the firms’ decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 99-101
(1963) (arguing that firms are “adaptively rational” systems that learn from their past experience
in an unstable and unpredictable environment, and thus the rationality of their decisions will be
limited by the “problems of learning,” such as the inability to see the full range of choices and
79
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this discussion does lead to an important methodological qualification. The
idea of behavioral international law, so far as it is applied to states, is not
simply to lift whatever knowledge we have gained about real individual
decisionmaking and plant it willy-nilly on states, in the way that traditional
L&E has often done with assumptions of human rationality. Rather, one
goal of the approach would be to seek observable systematic diversions
from rationality in state behavior, without simply assuming that those
biases and heuristics found in individuals are replicated by states. Indeed,
as already noted, behavioral psychology does not claim that all individuals
suffer from the same cognitive biases or employ the same decisionmaking
heuristics. It would be a travesty to behavioral theory to claim that states
simply reproduce particular individual behavioral traits. Thus a behavioral
approach to international law could focus on examining the decisions made
by states in differing circumstances from a behavioral perspective, rather
than simply applying individual behavioral theory to states. For example,
one would not simply assume that states qua states have a fairness bias; this
would have to be demonstrated empirically. Under this approach, one
would maintain the state as the decisionmaking unit and look into the
consistency of deviations from rationality apparent in the state’s decisional
outputs.
The second way of arguing that states might actually overcome both
the bounded rationality of individuals (ostensibly undermining recourse to
behavioral economic analysis of international law) and their naturally
unitary character would be to cut the Gordian knot and look within the
state. Perhaps processes taking place within the state perfect its rationality?
To be sure, this line of argument would appear to be inherently inconsistent
with the way economic analyses of international law have worked so far:
with few exceptions, L&E analyses of international law have accepted the
state as a unitary, even monolithic, actor.83 But contrary to the assumptions
of realist theorists, states do not act like black boxes or billiard balls. Rather,
payoffs available). Elements of this approach have recently been transposed to international
relations. See JOSEPH JUPILLE, WALTER MATTLI & DUNCAN SNIDAL, INSTITUTIONAL
CHOICE AND GLOBAL COMMERCE 6-7, 22-23 (2013) (advancing the notion that the bounded
rationality of states explains why preexisting institutions that are “good enough” persist despite
the opportunity to change to “better” institutional arrangements).
83
The most notable exceptions are Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political
Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127, 154-55
(2010), which argues that a state’s decision to comply or not to comply with international law is a
result of changes in domestic coalitions caused by the international law, and Joel P. Trachtman,
Open Economy Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 544, 555, in which
the author develops a model where domestic lobbying and voting based on preferences are the
causal factors for determining states’ compliance with international law.
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state behavior with respect to international law is the outcome of intricate
social, political, administrative, and legislative processes that take place
within the state. Yet, crucially, looking within the state does not negate the
subsequent treatment of the state as an actor with individually observable
behavioral traits.
Liberalist international relations scholars have long recognized the
complex interactions between domestic politics and international relations,
through the metaphors of the second image84 or the two level game.85 For
present purposes we are concerned with the question whether behavioral
economic approaches can meaningfully be applied to states at the second,
international level. Arguably, for bounded rationality (let alone bounded
willpower or self-interest) to be manifest at the international game level—
in which we ought to include international law constructions and
constraints—biases and heuristics must factor in also, and indeed initially,
at the domestic game level. There is in fact a substantial body of research
and scholarship on the role of bounded rationality in domestic political
processes,86 as well as public policy and administration.87 To the extent that
imperfect rationality within the state is a necessary condition for
considering states as boundedly rational actors (unitary or non-unitary,
depending on one’s definitions), it is quite easily satisfied.
This does not, however, remove entirely this argument against applying
bounded rationality to the state on the international plane because of intrastate process. All that this scholarship might contribute in the present
context is that cognitive biases and heuristics evident in the domestic policy
environment may influence the preference formation of the state as an actor
on the international level. In this sense, we are here merely confronted with
a particular form of thin rationality of states.88 Domestic bounded
rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for international behavioral
84
See generally Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of
Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881 (1978) (examining the effects of international politics on
domestic politics and domestic structures on the international system).
85
See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (conceiving of international relations as a two-level game, one at the
national level and one at the international level).
86
See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 300 (1985) (“[B]ehavior depends on the structure of
the [voters’] utility functions, and . . . on their representations of the world in which they live,
what they attend to in that world, and what beliefs they have about its nature.”).
87
See Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public
Administration and Public Policy, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 395, 406-07 (2003)
(explaining that a sound explanation of public administrative behavior must focus on informationprocessing and not just principal–agent problems).
88
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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analysis, although it might play a part. What we might know about the
rationality of domestic policy and state preference formulation does not
necessarily reflect upon the overall rationality of the state as an actor in
pursuit of those preferences in the international environment.
This theoretical uncertainty seems, however, to cut both ways. On one
hand, in principle states can be imperfectly rational at the domestic level,
yet perfectly rational at the international level. One might even
hypothesize that the aggregation of differential bounded rationalities of
various agents at the sub-state level produces some sort of perfect
rationality of the state in international affairs. On the other hand, bounded
rationality might simply carry over to the international plane, whether en
banc or in subtle and variegated ways.
We do not really know, in theory or in practice, how bounded
rationalities interact with each other at different degrees of contingency,
whether horizontally (within the state) or vertically (between the domestic
environment and the international level). But this uncertainty only
encourages behavioral analysis of international law.
Perhaps more importantly, this discussion shows that the state
(whether viewed as unitary or not) is a plausible individual unit to which
behavioral economics can be applied, at least under particular informed
circumstances—certainly no less so than traditional rational choice and
L&E analyses. However, it also demonstrates that there is still much to
learn and examine from a behavioral perspective if the state is to be
regarded as such a unit of analysis. But we need not resolve these issues
entirely; there is no question that sub-state entities, such as decisionmaking
collectives and the individual, can also figure significantly in the study of
behavioral international law.
2. Decisionmaking Collectives in International Law
A second response to the objection based on the individual focus of
behavioral analysis would be to eschew state-level analysis, looking instead
at the behavioral aspects of collective decisionmaking within states and
other relevant entities, such as nonstate actors, international bureaucracies,
and tribunals, that lead to outcomes in international law. In other words, no
methodological statism would be involved. Rather, this second level of
analysis recognizes that states do not make decisions relating to
international law; people do—or most often, groups of people do.
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There exists a significant behavioral literature on cognitive biases in
small decisionmaking groups.89 In particular, there is an important debate
on the existence and effects of “groupthink,” defined as the set of
phenomena in which individuals comprising a decisionmaking group suffer
“a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment
that results from in-group pressures.”90 Small-group decisionmaking
theories based on behavioral psychology have been applied in international
politics (but not law) to decisions such as whether to embark in
international interventions.91 Prospect theory has also been applied to
relevant group decisions, including to foreign policy decisions and
bureaucracies.92 There are even empirical studies examining the existence
of decisionmaking biases in extremely large decisionmaking collectives,
such as the U.S. electorate.93 In short, there is room to engage seriously in
the study of the rationality of choices pertaining to international law at the
decisionmaking group level of analysis.
89
See, e.g., Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, 80
REV. ECON. STUD. 429, 438 (2013) (suggesting that a group member has the incentive to deny
reality when the member’s colleagues are denying reality in a way that is harmful to the group);
Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 696-98 (1996) (demonstrating theoretically that
the process by which groups transform individual preferences into group decisions—majority rule,
proportionality, or consensus—affects the degree of bias in the group).
90
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982); see also PAUL ’T HART, GROUPTHINK IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY
OF SMALL GROUPS AND POLICY FAILURE 5-12 (1990) (clarifying Janis’s groupthink as “an
excessive form of concurrence-seeking” and delineating three antecedent conditions for it: high
cohesiveness of the decisionmaking group, specific characteristics in the group’s organizational
context, and stressful internal and external characteristics of the situation). But see Glen Whyte,
Recasting Janis’s Groupthink Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes, 73
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 185, 194-97 (1998) (suggesting that it is
not group cohesiveness, but high collective efficacy, or the “illusion of invulnerability,” which leads
to groupthink symptoms, because it causes decisionmakers to perceive all choices as between
maintaining an unacceptable status quo—“a sure loss”—or taking an action that if unsuccessful
will lead to a greater loss but if successful will yield great gains).
91
See VERTZBERGER, supra note 38, at 90-99 (surveying how social interaction affects a
group’s ability to perceive and tolerate risk in four ways: by diluting each individual group
member’s responsibility for a risky decision; by allowing more resolute members, who are usually
risk-tolerant, to persuade others; by facilitating the exchange of information that often leads
members to be more confident in their positions; and by revealing each group member’s risk
tolerance).
92
See generally ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1998).
93
See Adam J. Berinsky & Jeffrey B. Lewis, An Estimate of Risk Aversion in the U.S. Electorate,
2 Q. J. POL. SCI. 139, 145-47 (2007) (concluding that American voters do not appear risk averse
because uncertainty about a candidate’s policy position did not cause a statistically significant loss
in the expected utility of voting for the candidate).
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Analogies from corporate law are again illuminating, mutatis mutandis.
For example, studies have shown that in some circumstances, lawyers
practice herd behavior that results in the persistence of suboptimal
provisions in bond indentures.94 Such reliance on inherited status quo,
precedent, and group wisdom might be a response to individual bounded
rationality, which could be countered by responsible board governance.95 It
is not difficult to conceive research questions and testable hypotheses
relating to similar occurrences of legal groupthink with respect to
international law. For example, to what extent do legal advisors engaged in
considering new international commitments, such as in the areas of climate
change or trade agreements, rely on the legal status quo, instead of
exercising their independent judgment on the best possible solutions?
There are also studies that identify groupthink in collective corporate
decisionmaking as a catalyst for unethical decisions that would not have
been made individually and link the lack of diversity in corporate
management to illegal acts by corporations.96 It would be illuminating to
examine decisions by executive decisionmaking groups and governmental
legal counsel to authorize acts that violate international law, such as some
armed attacks or torture authorizations.97
To be sure, looking into the state or within organizations and other
collective units interacting with international law in this way could bring us
back to the claim that behavioral traits observable at the individual level
wash away at the collective level. Here the argument would be that internal
decisionmaking settings have a corrective effect on individuals’ bounded
rationality, leading to more perfect rationality in decisions made at the
94
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 355-56 (1996) (suggesting that
“herd behavior” explains the adoption of standard contract terms even when customized terms
would have greater expected value because a lawyer suffers more reputational harm if a failed
contract contains customized terms than if it contains standard terms that many other lawyers
have used in similar contexts).
95
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2002) (proposing that if group decisionmaking reduces the information
asymmetries among group members, a member will have less incentive to “herd,” or simply follow
the ideas of presumably better informed colleagues).
96
See Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal
Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138, 157 (1995) (suggesting that homogeneity within a “top
management team” increases pressures for conformity); Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 651, 654 (1992) (asserting that groupthink
causes directors to overvalue each other’s approval and discount the ethical concerns of those
outside the group).
97
Thus, one wonders to what extent groupthink and other behavioral phenomena enabled the
advice provided by U.S. Department of Justice lawyers relating to torture. See generally Jens David
Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193 (2010).
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leadership level. To illustrate, there are indications that within business
corporations, individuals who are relative risk-takers and less prone to lossaversion rise disproportionately to corporate leadership echelons; it could
follow that the corporate decisions made by the decisionmaking groups
composed of these individuals are more in keeping with perfect
rationality.98 If similar selection effects were shown to exist in parliamentary politics or in military command promotions, this could have
significant implications for understanding the rationality of group decisions
in international law, in that they might actually have a relatively low level of
biases and heuristics. Indeed, the result might even be that in some cases
decisionmaking groups are more rational than individuals, to some extent
vindicating traditional rational choice.99
These are, however, only hypotheses and examples. The application of
behavioral approaches to collective decisionmaking is far from simple. Even
in economic fields, such as corporate and antitrust law, attempts to explore
the impacts of cognitive biases on firm-level decisions have been few and
far between. At this stage, the important point is that behavioral research
on international law can be meaningfully conducted at this level of analysis,
setting aside the individual methodology objection to a behavioral approach
to international law.
3. The Individual as a Subject and Decisionmaker in International Law
A third response to the individualist methodological objection would
be to simply focus on individual decisionmaking that relates to
international law. The place of the individual is no longer in question or
“prospective,” as it was half a century ago.100 In classical international law,
individual actions may be attributed to the state, giving rise to state
responsibility under various circumstances,101 and so analyses of individual

98
See Donald C. Langevoort, Heuristics Inside the Firm: Perspectives from Behavioral Law and
Economics (positing that since promotion decisions are made based on observable results rather
than unobservable innate skill of the candidates, successful risk-taking candidates who produce
the highest results will be promoted), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 50, at 87, 93.
99
For a model that attempts to prove this, see Andrew Farkas, Evolutionary Models in Foreign
Policy Analysis, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 343, 351, 355 (1996), which hypothesizes that selection effects,
where the group member who recommends successful policies gains influence in the next round of
decisionmaking, leads to an increase in the rationality of group decisions over time.
100
See Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 435, 435
(1964) (“[T]he individual’s ‘place’ on the stage of world law remains generally diverse and, on the
whole, prospective in nature.”).
101
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 121 (2002) (“In many cases, the
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behavior are important for understanding state behavior. Put differently,
many cases of compliance or noncompliance with international law are
ultimately made by individuals, such as soldiers in the field, immigration
officers, customs officials, and legal advisors. Moreover, in modern
international law, individuals are increasingly direct addressees and
beneficiaries of international law, especially in the areas of investment
protection, international human rights, international criminal law, and
international humanitarian law, the last constituting an area with major
scope for behavioral research, as will be discussed in the next subsection. In
addition, some state-to-state law takes into account, or is premised on,
assumptions about private behavior, such as the World Trade Organization’s
goal of “providing security and predictability” to traders.102
The point need not be belabored here: behavioral analysis of
international law is not restricted to unitary state behavior. There is a rich
field of international legal issues that can be examined at the level of
individual behavioral economics, in addition to the state level and group
decisionmaking levels, whose application is more complex but with the
potential to be at least as illuminating.
B. The Empirical Foundations of Behavioral Theory
It is perhaps the crowning achievement of behavioral analysis of law
that it is based on claims about human behavior that are empirically
substantiated. Some go so far as to say that “legal scholarship not drawing
on empirical behavioral findings is not engaged in a behavioral analysis of
law.”103 If the behavioral approach’s predictions about actors’ actions in the
face of legal prescriptions are more dependable and realistic than those of
standard rational choice theory with all its explanatory strengths, it is
because of the behavioral approach’s empirical, and more so, experimental,
basis. In this respect, an objection could be raised toward a behavioral
approach to international law: that the empirical—and especially
experimental—insights and methods of behavioral analysis are difficult, if
not impossible, to apply to international law.
Clearly, there are methodological difficulties in applying an
experimental empirical approach to international law. At the state level, one
conduct which is acknowledged and adopted by a State will be that of private persons or
entities.”).
102
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S.
404.
103
Tor, supra note 51, at 273.
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cannot conduct experiments. At the group decisionmaking level, access to
actual decisionmaking groups and senior decisionmakers is normally limited
for most researchers. Experimental research with individuals also poses
significant challenges. Access to real international law decisionmakers such
as trade officials or military commanders for experimental purposes is also
constrained. Even if achieved, it would be difficult to design experiments
that replicate the real-life environment of decisionmaking. However, this
objection merely underscores the nonempirical basis of most international
legal research. Recent years have witnessed a growing cadre of legal
scholars who apply quantitative and qualitative empirical research methods
to international law.104 Nonbehavioral empirical research of international
law encounters many of the same difficulties that behavioral research of
international law would be faced with, and copes with them successfully.
There are, in fact, a number of ways in which behavioral analysis could
be meaningfully applied to international law, on the basis of empirical
findings, experimental or not. In this sense, a behavioral approach to
international law is no different than general behavioral legal research.
Following Tor’s useful menu for research,105 behavioral insights on the law
can be gained through three complementary channels: (1) theoretical
applications, (2) experimental research, and (3) field studies. The strengths
and weaknesses of each methodology should be recognized, but each of
them retains an empirical basis and could be applied to different
104
See, e.g., GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC–PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (using WTO data to determine the social, political,
and legal implications for the U.S. and European approaches to public–private networks in
international governance); Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Ruling Not to Rule: The Use of
Judicial Economy by WTO Panels (using data from WTO panel reports to analyze the relationship
between mixed submissions and the exercise of judicial economy), in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 263, 276 (Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch & Amelia Porges
eds., 2011); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 784 (2008) (finding that “international economic law has
tangible international law obligations in treaties, and there is associated data that are ripe for
empirical analysis”); Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 598 (2007) (using “a hazard analysis to test the strength of the specific
predictions regarding states’ willingness to commit to human rights treaties”); Krzysztof J. Pelc,
Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions, 67
INT’L ORG. 629, 631 (2013) (relying on search-engine data to analyze behavioral reactions to
violations of international law). For an overview, see generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg,
The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
105
See Tor, supra note 51, at 272-91 (“A review of extant scholarship in the behavioral approach
as defined here reveals two distinct, albeit closely related, methodological genes. The more
common involves theoretical applications of behavioral evidence generated by non-legal,
empirical, scholarship. Its rarer but important counterpart genre conducts direct empirical, mostly
experimental, tests of legally relevant questions.”).
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international legal puzzles, showing that this objection is definitely not one
that can stop behavioral analysis of international law at the threshold.
1. Theoretical Applications
Theoretical applications take research scenarios in which a divergence
from perfect rationality is noted on the basis of general empirical evidence,
and then apply the ramifications to a legal rule or institution. The
application is theoretical in the sense that although it is empirically valid in
one area, it is being applied in a different legal field and set of
circumstances; hence, empirical authority is reduced. This migrational
methodology will be familiar to most interdisciplinary legal scholars:
theoretical knowledge from non-legal fields is adopted and applied to legal
issues; empirical knowledge from one field of law migrates to another. In
international legal research, theoretical application could also include cases
in which insights from behavioral economics in other areas of law are
applied to international law, or instances in which nonlegal IR research on
behavior of states and other actors has international legal implications.
For example, theoretical applications of cognitive psychology challenge
the traditional rational choice parameters of deterrence in criminal law106 by
suggesting (among other points) that optimism or overconfidence biases
could cause potential offenders to underestimate the probability that they
will be apprehended and convicted. Moreover, the availability bias might
mean that visibly increased enforcement has a greater effect on deterrence
than increased punishment.107 These are both theoretical applications of
general expressions of bounded rationality to a legal issue, with
implications for criminal enforcement policy. Given that a central goal of
international criminal justice is deterrence and prevention of future
international crimes by punishing existing ones,108 any theoretical
106
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
180 (1968) (describing the deterrence parameter as a function of p, the probability of conviction,
and f, the punishment).
107
Jolls, supra note 70, at 277 (suggesting that availability bias predicts that potential parking
violators would be more likely to be deterred if the risk of receiving a parking ticket was more
salient and vivid).
108
Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787 (2006) (“The deterrence rationale for
[international criminal tribunals] usually takes the form of a generalized argument in favor of
justice for perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities and in opposition to impunity and
realpolitik.”); Otto Triffterer, The Preventive and Repressive Function of the International Criminal
Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO
IMPUNITY 137, 144 (M. Politi and G. Nesi eds., 2001); see also Invited Experts on Prevention
Question, ICC FORUM, http://iccforum.com/prevention (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), archived at
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application of behavioral psychology to criminal law would by extension be
relevant to international criminal law.
However, this example demonstrates the main weakness of theoretical
application as a methodology: the external validity challenge, which creates
and augments the difficulty in transferring empirical findings from one
research group to another group that differs from the first in its personality
and environment.109 To what extent can behavioral traits established in
experimental research among college students under laboratory conditions
be applicable to criminals? To what extent can theories applied to criminals
in the setting of domestic law and society be reapplied to potential war
criminals acting in very different circumstances and under very different
utility functions? When the external validity—or generalizability—of
behavioral inferences is questionable, theoretical applications can still be
highly useful because they have the ability to generate interesting
hypotheses. However, these hypotheses would then need to be tested
against relevant empirical evidence through field studies or experimental
research. To be sure, this will not always be possible, in which case the
behavioral insights should be understood as bearing reduced research value,
but not less than that of nonempirical methods.
2. Experimental Research
Experimental behavioral legal research entails controlled and
randomized experiments in which participants’ reactions to different
treatments in legal settings are polled and statistically compared, within
experimental and control groups. This allows the researcher “to draw
conclusions about the causal effects of the experimental treatment.”110 For
example, groups of randomly selected students can be asked to play the role
of trial jurors and to answer certain questions with different fact patterns.
In international legal issues, the same groups could be asked to pose as
individuals in combat settings with respect to rules of international
humanitarian law, or as regular citizens with respect to human rights issues.
While the strength of experimental research lies in its controlled and
randomized environment, this is also the source of its weakness. Again we
are faced with the problem of external validity. Both the subjects and the
http://perma.cc/T7QX-NUCJ (summarizing expert opinions on the question of the role of the
International Criminal Court in crime prevention).
109
See Tor, supra note 51, at 280 (“Th[e] [external validity] problem concerns the validity of
inferences about whether the . . . effect . . . holds over variations in persons, settings, treatment
variables, and measurement variables.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110
Id. at 285.
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circumstances are very different from those that govern in reality. Although
there is evidence that behavioral simulations and surveys, properly
conducted, can provide reliable evidence that conforms to results from the
field,111 experimental research is often treated with suspicion in the social
sciences as lacking in its realism and generalizability.112 Nevertheless, some
scholars contend that most of the objections to experimental research are
misguided and that more experimental social science research should be
conducted as a significant complement to and corroboration of field
research.113 Behavioral legal research—certainly with respect to
international law—faces similar dilemmas; but ultimately, their resolution
will depend on the ability to conduct meaningful experimental research on
particular research questions, and researchers should take cognizance of this
in both their selection of research topics and in the design of experiments.
For example, experimental studies relating to international humanitarian
law or trade law can be upgraded by conducting controlled experiments
with groups of relevant decisionmakers, such as military commanders and
trade officials and executives, respectively.114
3. Field Studies
Experimental research is not the only way to gather empirically valid
information about the way people make decisions. Indeed, some consider
field research, which uses observational testing of real behavior, to be the
first-best method. A significant criticism leveled at the behavioral L&E
movement is that knowledge gleaned from experiments is limited in its
ability to provide guidance for real life policy because it lacks context, and

111
Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay & Brad J. Bushman, Research in the Psychological
Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 8 (1999) (“The
obvious conclusion from Figure 1 is that the psychological laboratory is doing quite well in terms
of external validity . . . .”).
112
Id. at 3 (summarizing the opposing view that “research from the psychological laboratory is
extremely invalid, and therefore pointless”).
113
See, e.g., Armin Falk & James J. Heckman, Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge
in the Social Sciences, 326 SCI. 535, 537 (2009) (“Experiments can be productive in complementing
the information obtained from other empirical methods. One can combine lab and field
experiments to better understand the mechanisms observed in the field.”).
114
Notably, international relations scholars have recently turned to experimental research,
some of it relating to international law. See Alex Mintz, Yi Yang & Rose McDermott, Experimental
Approaches to International Relations, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 493, 494-98 (2011) (describing five types
of experiments used in international relations); see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 72
(manuscript at 4-5) (“By studying both populations using identical experimental instruments we
explore not just how behavioral traits relate to policy preferences for trade cooperation but also
help reveal how non-elite samples may differ from real policy elites.”).
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should be at least supplemented by field observations.115 However,
observational testing of behavioral questions in legal contexts is still rare.116
In this respect, international legal research might actually have significant
strengths. At the state level of analysis, the relevant research group for
observational field research is limited to under 200 entities, with a vast
historical background for research. This can foment quantitative research,
in fields such as international litigation, which although on the rise is still
much easier to track in terms of volume than the domestic judicial activity
of even a small state. Qualitative empirical research is quite developed, such
as in international political economy. One can glean a lot of information on
decisionmaking processes117 given this long historical memory.118
Quantitatively, international relations researchers have already compiled
historical databases that can be relevant to ex post observational testing of
legal issues; one example is the Correlates of War (COW) project.119 Field
studies at the individual level are difficult but possible.120
In sum, there is no a priori reason to discard the idea of conducting
empirical behavioral research in international law. Instead, it is quite the
contrary: such research can be conducted in all three methodological
streams (theoretical application, experimental research and field studies) in
meaningful ways.
C. The Parsimony of Traditional Concepts of State Rationality
The final general objection to a behavioral approach to international
law would be that its high degree of contingency—on actors, environments,
and levels of analysis—would make it unparsimonious, in contrast with the
parsimony that characterizes traditional economic or rational choice
115

See Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral
Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 1002-03 (2000) (“Legal scholarship that
seeks to incorporate the insights of empirical social science must be aware of the limitations of
such knowledge. Before laboratory results can serve as the basis for legal policy, they must be
replicated in field studies that resemble as closely as possible ‘natural’ conditions. And proposed
interventions must be tried in small-scale pilot studies before they are implemented broadly.”).
116
See Tor, supra note 51, at 281 (“Observational tests of legal questions have become
increasingly popular in recent decades, although still relatively uncommon compared to
traditional legal scholarship.”).
117
See supra note 104.
118
See, e.g., Barbara Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory, 13
POL. PSYCHOL. 205, 225 (1992) (applying prospect theory to an analysis of President Roosevelt’s
behavior in the Munich hostage crisis).
119
See CORRELATES WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/Q33B-7TRS.
120
See Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 134-35 (recognizing criticisms of previous studies for failing
to collect actual battlefield data and undertaking a study of state practice).

1136

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1099

analyses of law and international relations. This is certainly true; indeed,
experimental literature has over time discovered so many cognitive biases,
sometimes contradictory, that it is dangerous to make generalizations in
research. This critique would not, however, be unique to international
behavioral analysis, and the response provided by behavioralists would
apply here as well. The parsimony achieved through rational choice theory
comes at the expense of empirical accuracy and predictive power.121 Ideally,
one should have both parsimony and accuracy. But ultimately, so long as
such an approach is not at hand, whether one prefers one method or
another is very much a question of both intellectual temperament and the
balance between accuracy and parsimony—how much of one is sacrificed
for the sake of the other. There would seem to be little to add to this
debate, but I would venture the following. A behavioral approach to
international law would not—and should not—underwrite a claim to
providing a theory of everything or even a theory of international law. It
would simply be an addition to the arsenal of methodologies of
international law, like rational choice or sociological approaches, applicable
and illuminating in some contexts, less so in others. Within the bounds of
those discrete areas in which it is both illuminating and intellectually
honest, it would be parsimonious, although parsimony should not be
confused with simplicity. So, for example, if behavioral research would
show that military field commanders do not currently or usually take the
remote possibility of international criminal prosecution as a consideration
in their operative calculations, but in contrast are deterred by domestic (and
more “available”) sanctions, such as investigations by committees of inquiry
and demotions, this specific finding would in itself be parsimonious, as well
as empirically accurate. Therefore, the risk of a lower degree of parsimony
in behavioral analysis is a methodological constraint to consider in the
design of research, but it is not a threshold barrier to it.
IV. SOME INDICATIVE APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH TO
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
So far, potential uses of behavioral research on international law have
been mentioned only in passing. In this Part, I will describe in more detail
select indicative applications of behavioral international research. By no
means should this discussion be mistaken for actual behavioral research.
121

See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 20-21 (“[T]o the extent that conventional
economics achieves parsimony, it often does so at the expense of any real predictive power.”); see
also Elms, supra note 33, at 240-42 (examining the role played by behavioral economics and
political psychology in economic decisionmaking).
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Rather, it comprises a set of prototypical research briefs and proposals,
which indicate in concrete yet general terms how behavioral research
projects could be conducted with respect to international legal questions. It
is a methodological tasting menu, an invitation for research. To be sure, as
noted above, there exist already some very thoughtful first buds of such
research.
The research issues discussed below have been selected so as to allow
for the full range of applicable levels of analysis (the state, small
decisionmaking groups, and individuals) discussed above in Section III.A,
and the full spectrum of behavioral research methods (theoretical
application, experimental research, and field studies) discussed in Section
III.B. They have also been selected to display both explanatory and
normative avenues of research and the ways in which behavioral research
can be either linked to rational choice frameworks or disengaged from
them. Finally, they cover a broad range of international legal issues, from
general international law and dispute settlement to international economic
and humanitarian law. The queries addressed are: (A) how can international
treaty-making be made more efficient?; (B) do collegial international
tribunals produce better outcomes than non-collegial ones?; and (C) should
international humanitarian law relating to target selection in armed conflict
take into account the bounded rationality of military commanders and
decisionmakers?
A. The State Level: The Efficiency of International Law-Making
and the Status Quo Bias
When can international lawmaking be deemed efficient? L&E scholars
have over the last decade or so devoted copious attention to explanations of
international lawmaking processes, especially their two central sources:
treaties and customary international law.122 A subset of this literature
criticizes international lawmaking as inefficient. In particular, scholars have
argued that international law does not adapt quickly or reflexively enough
to the preferences of states and the needs of the global community. Thus,
for example, international legal responses to global warming and
122
See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 23, at 1116-20 (discussing the origins of, compliance
with, and evolution of customary international law); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 115, 131-75 (2005) (outlining a theory of customary
international law rooted in rational choice); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary
International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544-73 (2005) (presenting a rationalist model of
customary international law); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579,
1601-10 (2005) (discussing nations’ adoption of and exit from international treaties).
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transnational terrorism remain blocked.123 In this Section, I will focus on a
particular critique of the efficiency of treaty formation, setting aside
discussion of critiques relating to customary international law as such.124
With respect to treaty law, Guzman has argued that the chief cause for
lack of progress toward effective global legal solutions is in many cases
international law’s strict requirement of consent in treaty-making:125 states
may be bound by treaty norms only if they have expressly consented to
them.126 Hence, so long as some states can object to new treaty
arrangements or to reforms of existing ones solely on the basis of their
narrow self-interest, they can prevent legal responses that satisfy the
collective interests of the international community. According to Guzman,
the consent requirement should be relaxed in ways that would enable the
global community to create law that would bind states non-consensually.127
What is most important for present purposes, however, is that
Guzman’s analysis builds on understandings of efficiency that lie firmly
within the standard economic approach to contract law. This approach
regards private contracts as efficient in the Coasean sense: bargaining
among parties will lead to an allocation of rights and obligations that
optimizes their preferences, regardless of initial allocations, provided that
transaction costs are at zero or are very low.128 The economic model of
contract law can be similarly extended to international treaties. States,
considered as unitary actors, enjoy substantial freedom in the pursuit of
their interests through bilateral and multilateral treaty-making, in a manner
reminiscent of the private ordering achieved through the freedom of
123

See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (examining the lack of treaty or customary
international law solutions to problems such as global warming or terrorism).
124
See GUZMAN, supra note 7, at 170-71 (discussing efficiency considerations involved in
membership in international agreements); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing
from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208-15 (2010) (discussing the relationship between
international treaties and customary international law); Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in
International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 895-906 (2006) (exploring the efficiency of
customary international law).
125
Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 751 (2012).
126
See LOUIS HENKIN, 18 INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 (1995) (“No
treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is binding on a state unless it has consented to
it.”); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2.1(g), art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (defining a “party” to a treaty as a State that has consented to be bound by it and
unambiguously providing that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent”).
127
In particular, Guzman advocates for increased use of nonconsensual rulemaking
procedures in international organizations, though stopping short of “limitless delegation of
authority.” See Guzman, supra note 125, at 789-90.
128
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 85 (6th ed. 2012).
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contract in domestic legal settings.129 From a rational choice perspective,
this can lead to welfare analyses familiar from contract theory, such as
efficient breach.130
Thus, where treaty obligations are entered into on an informed and
voluntary basis, rational choice models generally assume that international
multilateral rules are efficient with respect to parties’ preferences, at least at
the time that these obligations are made. The classical Paretian formulation
posited by Trachtman states in this respect that “[i]n the cooperative treaty
game, any treaty must be such that, at least in prospective terms, each
adherent receives a benefit that is at least as great as it would receive if it
did not join in the treaty.”131 As Guzman explains, a Pareto-efficient
improvement in treaty law (whether reforms to an existing treaty regime or
the launch of a new one) would entail that at least some parties gain from
it, but none are made worse off by it (compared with the prevailing legal
situation prior to the change).132 In contrast, a Kaldor–Hicks efficient treaty
improvement would be such that the benefit granted to some states from
the change would be greater than the disadvantage caused to other states; in
other words, aggregate utility is increased, although there are winners and
losers in a distributive sense.133 To Guzman, the strict consent requirement
in international lawmaking epitomizes a Pareto concept of efficiency;
aggregate welfare is sacrificed to the maintenance of individual state
welfare.134
There are several difficulties with this analysis, but let me focus on one
that highlights the possible theoretical application of insights from
behavioral economics. Guzman’s compelling analysis against consent
assumes first that states will, as a rule, agree to changes in treaty law if they
benefit from them or at the very least do not suffer from them (Pareto
efficient treaty reform) or if they are counted among the winners from a
129

See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 244 (1993)
(“[I]f two parties are to be observed entering into a contract, one should normally presume that
they would not have done so unless they felt that the contract was likely to make them better
off.”).
130
See, for example, discussion of ex post “efficient breach” with respect to international
treaties in TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 142-44. See also ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B.
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-109 (2006) (advancing the “optimal enforcement” theory of
international law); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal
Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 246-64 (2011)
(discussing the concept of “efficient breach” in the context of international treaties).
131
TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 128.
132
Guzman, supra note 125, at 758.
133
Id.
134
Id.

1140

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1099

Kaldor–Hicks efficient treaty change. In the face of these rationality-based
assumptions, cognitive psychology provides a startling insight: all things
considered, people actually have a tendency to prefer an existing state of
affairs over alternatives that might leave them better off. This is referred to
as the status quo bias. Experiments with individuals show that they
disproportionately prefer the status quo over alternatives when making
decisions: “Faced with new options, decision makers often stick with the
status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary company policy, to
elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to purchase the same
product brands, or to stay in the same job.”135 This phenomenon is
conceptually related to the endowment effect, in the sense that people view
the existing state of affairs as an endowment that they value more than
possibly improved conditions, which they associate with risk and
uncertainty.
The status quo bias has distinct implications for the development of
legal systems and arrangements, both domestic and international.
Generally, it suggests that contracts will be inherently “sticky” and
inefficient because agents prefer to keep the law as it is, even when the law
lags behind changes in their otherwise rational interests and preferences,
and even in the face of personal, commercial, or other developments.136
A more advanced application of the status quo bias relates to default
rules—rules that apply in the absence of a specific agreement to apply
different rules. Coasean economics predicts that default rules—the initial
legal arrangement—will not affect bargained contractual arrangements,
unless precluded by transaction costs, and so their effect in real legal
relations is minimal. Yet experimental research conducted among private
contractors has confirmed the status quo bias and shown that default rules
matter; there is a tendency to adopt them in negotiated settings, even if
they are inefficient. Thus, default rules are not just a fallback when certain
issues are left open in contracts; they have an effect on negotiated contracts
as well. These phenomena have been observed not only in relation to
default rules established by law but also with respect to standard form or
boilerplate terms that are not ex ante binding upon parties.137
135

William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
136
For a survey of evidence of status quo bias and an application to contract law, see generally
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).
137
See id. at 630-33; see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-88 (1998) (“Th[e]
preference for default terms is evident even when transaction costs of contracting around the
default are very low and there is no strategic advantage in choosing not to contract around the
default.”).
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What does this imply for the critique of the strict consent
requirement’s efficiency in treaty-making? The immediate implication is
that states might regularly withhold consent from new treaty regimes and
treaty reforms, not only because they believe these regimes and reforms run
counter to their best interests, but because of an embedded behavioral
aversion to change.
Thus, where Guzman sees the consent requirement as the cause for an
observed status quo bias in international treaty law,138 it might be that the
“excessive commitment to consent”139 that he decries is in fact the formal
result of a behavioral status quo bias. States preserve the constraints of the
consent requirement because it enables them to pursue their (imperfectly
rational) preference for status quo. In some respects this makes the critique
even stronger because it indicates that the consent requirement may even
facilitate the scuttling of treaty regimes and reforms that would be Paretoefficient (i.e., when no state has a rational reason to object), not just those
that are Kaldor–Hicks efficient. Treaty reform can therefore be exceedingly
difficult even when everybody stands to gain.
The policy implications of this theoretical application are that relaxing
the consent requirement would not be sufficient to solve the problem. In
many cases, states will still eschew formal legal change. Even in
majoritarian and institutional rulemaking settings in international
organizations, states might prefer to maintain the rulemaking status quo of
consent, despite the existence of alternative formal possibilities. A living
example is the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although the WTO’s
institutional provisions allow for various forms of majority decisionmaking,
including amendments to the substantive treaties,140 members rarely resort
to these provisions, and a culture of consensus continues to govern
decisionmaking.141
Beyond merely refining the critique of consent, acknowledging
behavioral status quo bias in treaty-making among states also gives rise to
interesting research questions and hypotheses that might be examined
empirically. For example, better knowledge of the real incidence and impact
138

It appears that Guzman intends the term in a colloquial rather than behavioral sense. See
Guzman, supra note 125, at 790 (“The overcommitment to state control over events creates a
suffocating status quo bias that does more harm than good.”).
139
See id. at 749.
140
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. IX-X, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
141
See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade
Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising
and Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 55 (2005) (indicating that
“the process of decision-making in the WTO is dominated by the practice of consensus”).
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of status quo bias in treaty-making can affect strategies for treaty reform
demandeurs. Multilateral treaty law can be developed in at least four ways:
(a) negotiations leading to the replacement of existing treaty regimes (e.g.,
the negotiation of the WTO Agreements as a comprehensive replacement
of GATT142 and patchwork of associated trade agreements that existed at
the time); (b) negotiation of new commitments within an existing treaty
regime, as mandatory (or partially mandatory), additional or revised
commitments (essentially, treaty amendments like the procedures
mentioned above as formally available in the WTO143 and amendments to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute144); (c) optional
negotiations (e.g., the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions145
and to the main human rights covenants146); and (d) negotiations conducted
entirely outside existing substantive treaty regimes (e.g., the recently
concluded (but not yet in force) Arms Trade Treaty, which was negotiated
within the U.N. but is independent of other arms control conventions147).
Even though the negotiated legal changes would be identical, each of these
approaches works with different default rules and environments. A
combination of quantitative and qualitative research would show which
strategy is more successful in practice (although other explanations beyond
status quo bias could be proffered).

142
See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5 & 6, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
143
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002). Amendments were adopted during the 2010 review conference,
notably with respect to the definition of the crime of aggression. See Jennifer Trahan, The Rome
Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 55 (2011) (detailing the amendments to the Rome Statute). The time of
entry into effect of these amendments may vary among states party to the Rome Statute; indeed
the amendment process includes elements of majority lawmaking. See id. at 85 (highlighting the
ultimate decision to allow states to accept amendments by ratification).
145
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (amending the Geneva Convention to more adequately protect victims of armed
conflicts); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (supplementing the Geneva Convention to “ensure a better protection for the
victims of those armed conflicts”).
146
See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(exemplifying an optional protocol within a treaty).
147
See Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mar. 18-28, 2013, Report of
the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/2013/2 (Apr.
2, 2013).
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Perhaps even more intriguing would be research comparing the
willingness of states to contract out, inter partes, from customary
international rules,148 compared with applicable multilateral treaty rules and
various “soft law” sources.149 Such a study would not assume the existence
of status quo bias, but attempt to establish its existence and compare the
relative stickiness of custom, convention, and (nonbinding) soft law as
default rules.
Indeed, there is much to consider further regarding behavioral insights
on the efficiency of the development of customary international law,150 but
my limited goal here is to present only selected indicative applications, and
these considerations must be reserved for future research.
B. Small Decisionmaking Groups: Judicial Design and
Conformity Effects in International Tribunals
The relatively recent rise of judicialization in international law151
provides fertile ground for behavioral studies on international courts as
decisionmakers. Psychological research has been applied to domestic judges
148

In principle, states can contract around customary international law: “There is no a
priori hierarchy between treaty and custom as sources of international law. However, in the
application of international law, relevant norms deriving from a treaty will prevail between the
parties over norms deriving from customary law.” INST. OF INT’L LAW, PROBLEMS ARISING
FROM A SUCCESSION OF CODIFICATION: CONVENTIONS ON A PARTICULAR SUBJECT (1995),
available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1995_lis_01_en.pdf. This principle does not
apply if the customary rules in question are considered to be jus cogens—which permit no
derogation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”).
149
On soft law, see generally Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard and Soft Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 197.
150
See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 124, at 252 (arguing that customary international law
is inefficient because it is too rigid, pursuant to the mandatory doctrine whereby states cannot
legally opt out from a customary rule of international law after it has been formed). Interestingly,
where the previously mentioned critique of treaty-formation argued that international law was
inefficiently inflexible because it did not allow for non-consensual rules, this critique of customary
law calls for states to be released from obligations to which they did not expressly commit. It is
not entirely clear what type of efficiency Bradley and Gulati take as their point of reference, but
as far as behavioral insights are concerned, one could at least hypothesize that the removal of
doctrinal or formal constraints on opt-outs from customary law would not achieve an increase in
normative efficiency. A behavioral status quo bias, taking existing customary rules as the default,
would lead states to generally retain their normative loyalties. Bradley and Gulati only briefly
mention the possibility that psychological factors contribute to the stickiness of customary
international law. See id. at 248 n.196 (citing Korobkin, supra note 136). For further discussion of
custom as default rules, see Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom: Choosing Between Default
Rules, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47 (2010).
151
See Shany, supra note 4, at 74-76 (tracking the increased use of courts and the expansion of
the court’s power in international law).
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as individual decisionmakers152 and to courts as small decisionmaking
groups, with rich and interesting results.153 There is no reason to think that
such research methods would not be applicable to international judges and
tribunals, or indeed, that research results from the domestic sphere could
not carry over, under certain conditions and, mutatis mutandis, to the
international domain as well. Behavioral research thus may hold significant
implications for the design of courts and tribunals.154
As an example, consider the ongoing debate regarding the desirability
of dissenting opinions in the WTO. The WTO dispute settlement system,
entailing state-to-state litigation relating to international trade law, is one
of today’s most active international tribunals. Disputes are addressed by ad
hoc panels and may be appealed to the standing Appellate Body.155
Dissenting or separate opinions are allowed, subject to certain formal rules
and practices, including a requirement that the dissenter remain
anonymous.156 Such opinions are, however, formally discouraged157 and are
in fact very rare.158
152
See, e.g., Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of
Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1113-14 (2002) (applying cognitive psychology
experiments “to examine the process that governs mental tasks that require integrating multiple,
ambiguous, and conflicting components into discrete choices,” the mental process that judges
apply in determining a legal controversy).
153
For two compendia of the state of the art, neither of which include reference to
international tribunals, see THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David E.
Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010); and Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial DecisionMaking: A Behavioral Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVORIAL ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 664 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
154
For a survey of the political science literature on international tribunals, see Mark A.
Pollack, Political Science and International Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 357, 361-69 (Cesare Pr. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany
eds., 2014). None of the literature includes applications of cognitive psychology to international
judges.
155
For a broad set of analyses of the WTO dispute settlement system, see generally THE
WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Giorgio
Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006).
156
The condition of anonymity applies at both the panel and Appellate Body levels. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 102, art. 14.3, art. 17.11. In passing, anonymity
itself raises interesting behavioral hypotheses. On one hand, anonymity ostensibly protects
dissenting panelists or Appellate Body members seeking reappointment from individual scrutiny
by member states. For a discussion of the potential role of dissent in reappointment, see Manfred
Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial
Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 406-07 (2014). On the
other hand, anonymity reduces prestige payoffs associated with the signed separate opinion.
157
Appellate Body Report, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, ¶ 3.2, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug.
16, 2010) (requiring the Appellate Body members to make every effort to take decisions by consensus).
158
See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 895, 899 (2006) (“Since the WTO’s inception, less than 6% of panel reports and less
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The WTO is not unique in this respect. In some domestic judicial
settings, even when judges are permitted to write separate opinions, they
often refrain from doing so. The option to write a dissenting opinion may
actually encourage “adversarial collaboration” on the bench, leading to a
high proportion of unanimous opinions in some domestic courts.159
Members of the United States Supreme Court largely avoided writing
individual opinions for over a century.160 Moreover, decisions of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) do not include dissents.161
However, the question of dissent is of particular importance in new
tribunals—as most international courts are—as it interacts with the
establishment of legitimacy in uncertain ways.162
Meredith Kolsky Lewis comprehensively canvassed many institutional
and historical reasons explaining the lack of dissent in WTO rulings, while
strongly arguing that an increase in dissenting opinions, certainly at the
panel level, would have positive effects on the quality of decisions and the
development of international trade law.163 She advocates removal of the
formal preference for consensus and several additional steps that would
encourage separate opinions.164
In contrast, James Flett has argued equally forcefully that panel
dissents have not had any appreciable effect on decisional quality, that the
“collective intelligence of reasonable judges should lead them to common
ground,” and that the overall collegiality of panels and the Appellate Body

than 2% of Appellate Body reports have included dissenting opinions.”). It should be noted that
the number of dissents has risen in recent years but largely due to a particular line of disputes
regarding U.S. Department of Commerce practices of “zeroing” in dumping investigations.
159
See Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1479,
1485-89 (2012) (discussing experience writing opinions as a federal judge on the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals).
160
See Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1158,
1159 fig.1 (1992) (depicting the spike in concurring and dissenting opinions that has occurred only
recently at the Supreme Court).
161
The practice of Advocate-General opinions preceding those of the CJEU allows for some
diversity of reasoning. For discussion, see generally Josef Azizi, Unveiling the EU Courts’ Internal
Decision-Making Process: A Case for Dissenting Opinions?, 12 ERA F. 49 (2011).
162
Speaking with one voice can bolster the position of a court; but enabling dissent projects
diversity and signals confidence. For a discussion of this tension in the early years of the U.S.
Supreme Court, see Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court
Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069, 2070-82 (1995).
163
See Lewis, supra note 158, at 917-19, 923 (arguing that WTO dissents can improve judicial
decisions, serve as markers for future decisionmaking, and spur legislators to respond to problems
with the law).
164
See id. at 928 (concluding that dissents should no longer be discouraged by the WTO).
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should be preserved.165 Others have also praised the high degree of
consensus in the Appellate Body in particular.166
This fascinating debate could benefit from behavioral insights, which it
currently lacks. Notably, the existing debate relies neither on L&E analysis
nor on a particular formulation of rationality. Instead, it relies on differing
interpretations of institutional settings and judicial outcomes. Behavioral
questions arise nevertheless. Beyond the institutional and formal
constraints on dissent, are there cognitive elements in judicial behavior at
the WTO that limit dissent? And how might these factors influence the
assessment of the quality of consensus decisions?
In the United States,167 there is a long tradition of theoretical and
empirical examination of issues by collegial courts (i.e., courts that reach
decisions as a group, with or without dissent168), as opposed to individual
judges.169 The use of such multimember courts is justified by the notion
that deliberation in a small, high-level group of jurists will help the court
arrive at the correct decision.170 However, it creates strategic interactions
between members of the court because no judge individually has the
authority to determine the outcome. Judges in collegial courts inevitably
must consider the views of their colleagues. These interactions are not only
strategic, but also personal, entailing psychological elements,171 which open
the door to cognitive and social psychology analysis.172
165

James Flett, Collective Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual
Opinions in WTO Jurisprudence, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 287, 287, 310 (2010).
166
See Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A Perfect
Model For International Adjudication?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 289, 289 (2009) (“The functioning of
the Appellate Body (AB) is virtually perfect in terms of collegial decision-making.”).
167
This is the case in other jurisdictions, including Canada. See Emmett Macfarlane, Essay,
Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 52 SUP. CT. L. REV. 379, 390-400 (2010).
168
The terms “collegial” and “collegiality” in the WTO are usually used in the narrower
sense, meaning all members of a panel or division of the Appellate Body agree to the same ruling.
169
Much of this literature pursues or engages with the so-called attitudinal approach, which is
primarily concerned with the influence of political or ideological attitudes of judges on their
decisions, especially in the United States Supreme Court. For an analysis of the Supreme Court,
see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); and LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For an analysis of the federal appellate courts, see generally VIRGINIA A.
HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL
COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2007).
170
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV.
469, 469-70 (1998).
171
See Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups (“[J]udges serving on appellate
courts may squabble like children, bond like family, or behave toward one another in a more
detached, professional manner, but both anecdotal and systematic evidence make clear that there
is an affective component to the interactions between and among judges serving on appellate
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These studies indicate behavioral findings such as “panel effects,”173
polarization, and “groupthink”174 in which judges participating in a group
decision concur with judicial outcomes that they would not have
pronounced on their own—a behavioral phenomenon that can generally be
referred to as “conformity effects.”175 The group context of judicial
decisionmaking can therefore influence judicial outcomes through cognitive
channels, although the scope of this influence is still unclear.
Perhaps most troubling among the various conformity effects is the
evidence from empirical research suggesting that the status of particular
bench members can disproportionately influence the decisions of other
members. Formal leadership (e.g., the position of chief justice or chair of a
judicial division) as well as social leadership roles in courts can influence
the independence of judicial colleagues’ opinions, reducing the likelihood of
dissent.176 This influence is only to be expected, and it casts doubts on the
idea that a group of judges can better approximate the correct result. One
recent study found that judges in criminal appeals in one domestic court
were fifty percent more likely to vote for defendants when a particular
justice did not preside than when he did.177 It should be emphasized that
this study examined a court in which each sitting judge was obliged to
determine his or her individual position on the verdict in the form of a
vote; in other words, a separate opinion was mandatory (but without a
courts.” (citation omitted)), in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note
153, at 73, 75.
172
To be sure, this is another area where the lines between cognitive and sociological research
tend to blur in terms of social psychology. As previously noted, Goodman and Jinks have written
extensively on the pressures to conform in different international law contexts, with reference to
cognitive effects. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
173
See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1329-31 (2009) (finding that the
behavior of judges on a federal appeals panel is better explained as reflexive to the preferences of
other members on the panel than as strategic to the possibility of being overruled on appeal).
174
See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional
Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 67-68 (2010) (arguing that “groupthink” negatively affects family court
proceedings).
175
See Martinek, supra note 171, at 82 (“[I]ndividuals participating in group decision making
processes are susceptible to conformity effects. . . . [M]embers of a group care about the
evaluations of their fellow group members . . . .”).
176
See id. at 79 (describing the influence that formal leadership and characteristics such as
collegiality or competence have on group decisionmaking); see also Haynie, supra note 160, at 1166
(finding that the leadership of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court affected the likelihood of
coming to a consensus).
177
Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Group Decision Making on Appellate
Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in the Israel Supreme Court, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 282, 282 (2013).
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requirement of providing written reasons), not optional, ostensibly
enhancing the possibility of dissent.178
Another strand of research looks at the conformity effects of seniority
on the bench. “Freshmen” judges can be disproportionality deferential to
incumbents because they desire socialization and acceptance.179 They might
also be treated paternalistically by senior judges,180 reducing their options
for independent impact, even when the possibility of dissent exists.
On this backdrop, we might ask, to what extent do leading WTO
dispute settlement roles, such as panel chairs, or Appellate Body
chairpersons, dominate the reports issued under consensus? Do they
squelch dissent, as Lewis argues? Or are there dominant personalities in the
panels and the Appellate Body that exercise social leadership, promoting
collegiality but preventing the development of diverse and perhaps
progressive or otherwise innovative solutions to problems in WTO law?
Are “newbie” panelists or even Appellate Body members (many of whom
arrive in Geneva with a wealth of prior professional experience, sometimes
as arbitrators) sociologically and psychologically deterred from taking
independent positions, let alone expressing them in dissenting or
concurring opinions? Evidence substantiating the hypotheses on
undesirable conformity effects could agitate in favor of the concern voiced
by Lewis.
It would be methodologically challenging to systematically collect such
evidence. Qualitative empirical research based on semi-structured interviews
of panelists, Appellate Body members, and attorneys and staff of the WTO
secretariat would be one avenue,181 although constraints of confidentiality
might restrict the knowledge gained to the level of anecdotal evidence,
which to some extent already circulates among cognoscenti. There are other
methods, however. Conformity effects in WTO dispute settlement—
specifically, the relative weight of panel chairs in determining outcomes—can
178

Id. at 286.
See Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects
and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 802 (2003)
(exploring the “freshman effect” on separate opinion authorship).
180
Cf. Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 POL.
BEHAV. 235, 252-53 (1996) (explaining the decrease in the number of opinions written by Justice
Rehnquist when he was elevated from Associate Justice to Chief Justice).
181
On conducting such interviews with elite groups in political circumstances, see Joel D.
Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews, 35 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
673, 674-75 (2002). For a recent study in an international relations context addressing the
possibility of expert rationality as well as the problem of overconfidence biases, see Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David G. Victor, The Cognitive Revolution and the Political
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 368, 370-78 (2013).
179
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in fact be gleaned from existing quantitative research that has been
conducted with respect to another long-standing debate in international
judicial design: whether rulings rendered by adjudicators appointed ad hoc
are of lower quality than those by permanent or standing judiciaries. As
already noted, WTO panelists are appointed ad hoc, while appeals are
made to the standing Appellate Body. Proposals have been made to create a
permanent panel body in the WTO.182 Proponents of such a standing body
often claim that permanent arbitrators or panelists, as the case may be, will
improve the quality of decisions because they will gain experience by virtue
of their permanent status.183 Thus, it has been argued that more
experienced panelists will yield higher quality panel decisions, as indicated
by a reduced rate of reversals made by the Appellate Body.184 Yet in a
quantitative study, Marc Busch and Krzysztof Pelc have shown that the
experience of panelists, in general, has no statistical effect on the likelihood
of panel rulings being reversed.185 However, when the panel chairs are
experienced, rulings are far less likely to be reversed by the WTO
Appellate Body.186 This strongly suggests that panel chairs have a
disproportionate role in panel outcomes (although no similar indications
exist with respect to the Appellate Body). It also shows a high degree of
acculturation to the system over time.
To be sure, this additional, empirically based knowledge does not
resolve the normative debate regarding the lack of dissent in the WTO.
Indeed, those opposed to increased expressions of dissent would argue that
it merely emphasizes the importance of consensus gathered around
experienced chairs who can promote the quality of panel rulings. There is
no need, however, to take a position on this question here. For present
purposes, the hypotheses raised by behavioral research on courts as small
decisionmaking groups are clearly relevant to international tribunals, in this
case demonstrating the effects of cognitive elements on judicial dissent in
the WTO, with implications for the quality of judicial decisions.
182

See generally William J. Davey, The Case for a WTO Permanent Panel Body, 6 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 177 (2003) (exploring the case for and against a permanent WTO panel body).
183
See, e.g., id. at 179-80 (“A permanent panel body would ensure a greater level of expertise
since its members would over time serve on many panels and thus be better able to deal with the
increased complexity of WTO dispute settlement.”).
184
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities
and Its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1,
at 2 (Mar. 13, 2002) (suggesting that permanent panels would result in fewer reversals, thereby
reducing time, workload, and costs).
185
Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 12 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 579, 591 (2009).
186
Id. at 591-92.
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C. The Individual: Target Selection, Framing Effects, and Preference
Reversals in International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law (IHL)—the “jus in bello”—is a branch of
public international law that imposes significant restrictions on the use of
violence by military forces during international (and noninternational)
armed conflict, through a mix of treaty and custom.187 Among IHL’s most
fundamental elements are the complementary principles of military
necessity and proportionality.188 Both of these principles require military
commanders (acting individually or in very small decisionmaking groups or
“cells,” as is often the case in practice)189 to make judgment calls, either in
the heat of battle or in more deliberate, strategic settings. Such targeting
decisions involve a combination of operational and legal factors that
amount to a kind of cost–benefit analysis necessarily performed under
conditions of uncertainty—the Clausewitzian fog of battle190—and
therefore provide an exceptionally appropriate area for research involving
legal standards, cognitive psychology of individuals, and empirical, even
experimental, research.
Under the IHL principle of military necessity, attacks must be directed
at military objectives (i.e., objectives that cumulatively make an effective
contribution to the adversary’s military action and whose destruction or
neutralization offers a definite military advantage).191 Under the IHL
principle of proportionality, it is recognized that an attack against a military
objective may cause “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” but this damage must

187

See generally THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Dieter Fleck
ed., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the development and application of international humanitarian law).
188
See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF
WAR 36-40, 51-53 (2013).
189
See, e.g., Tony Montgomery, Legal Perspective from the EUCOM Targeting Cell, 78 INT’L L.
STUD. 189, 190-95 (2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/kosovo_legal.pdf
(describing the process used to determine military targets).
190
See John Ferris & Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of
Command in Military Operations, 10 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 1, 1-2 (1995) (describing
the “inability to collect accurate, relevant and complete data about the battlefield, and on one’s
own forces no less than on the enemy”).
191
See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 798-805 (2010) (describing the balance
between military necessity and respect for humanity and the codification of international
humanitarian law). The principle has deep historical roots. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln,
Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 213, 215 (1998) (describing the historical origins of the military necessity principle).

2015]

Behavioral International Law

1151

not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”192
In other words, under IHL, military commanders must assess the
potential for a military advantage proffered by a contemplated attack on a
military target and balance this advantage against the possible harm to
civilian objects (often referred to as “collateral damage”). Not surprisingly,
however, the assessment of both sides of this equation is rife with
speculation and subjectivity.193 Moreover, the content of these tests remains
vague and problematic in its application, both ex ante and ex post, for
example in the context of “targeted killings”194 and drone attacks195 or the
choice between aerial attacks of different types (e.g., “precision” versus
“area” bombings)196 or the option of more accurate—but more dangerous—
methods of ground incursions (e.g., “boots on the ground”).
This vagueness has led some jurists to establish the notion of the
“reasonable military commander” as a normative benchmark that can be
seen as an objective—perhaps minimum—standard of conduct with respect
to operative decisions such as targeting. A committee established to advise
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding the legal aspects of NATO attacks in Kosovo
in the late 1990s197 had this to say on the applicable legal standard:

192

Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 51.5(b). The Protocol is not conventionally binding upon all
states, but these provisions can be taken, at least for present purposes, to be a concise formulation
of the principle of proportionality in customary international law.
193
There are models for estimating collateral damage that are employed at some levels. See,
e.g., Steven C. Gordon & Douglas D. Martin, Modeling and Simulation for Collateral Damage Estimation
in Combat, 5805 PROC. SPIE 309, 309 (2005), available at http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/
proceeding.aspx?articleid=864347 (describing how modeling is used to minimize predicted
collateral damage in a combat situation); Jeffrey H. Grotte, A Targeting Model that Minimizes
Collateral Damage, 25 NAVAL RES. LOGISTICS Q. 315, 315-16 (1978) (describing a mathematical
model which prescribes the minimum and maximum amounts of damage allowed).
194
See Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of
the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 313-18
(2007) (exploring the application of international humanitarian law—the principle of
proportionality—to military operations involving targeted killing).
195
The literature on drone warfare has grown exponentially over the last few years. See, e.g.,
Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed Conflict,
85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 656-65 (2009) (analyzing the legality of drone strikes).
196
For an account of this historical problem, see generally W. Hays Parks, ‘Precision’ and ‘Area’
Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?, 18 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 145 (1995).
197
For accounts of the central issues, see generally W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality
During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 489 (2001); and Daniel
H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 597 (2002).
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The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary
to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ
depending on the background and values of the decision maker. It
is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat
commander would assign the same relative values to military
advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely
that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and
differing degrees of combat experience or national military
histories would always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the
determination of relative values must be that of the “reasonable military
commander”. Although there will be room for argument in close
cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders
will agree that the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian
objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage gained.198
In many contexts, such a standard of reasonableness would be viewed as a
legal fiction of sorts, or as an aspirational, normative test.199 By employing
theories and methodologies from behavioral economics, applied to the
relevant decisionmakers—military commanders, whose actions are
attributable to states and, in certain circumstances, might bear international
criminal responsibility for their own decisions—it should be possible to
grant the reasonableness standard real meaning. This could enable us to
draw the contours of an answer to what is essentially an empirical question
with normative implications: who is the reasonable military commander?
Interesting hypotheses in this respect arise from the study of cognitive
framing effects that occur when alternative descriptions of the same
decision problem give rise to different preferences.200 Experimental
research on the psychology of risk-related decisionmaking has shown that
individual decisionmakers’ preferences can shift when the same problem is
framed in different ways. In the most foundational experimental proof of
this behavioral bias, Tversky and Kahneman showed that subjects made
different choices when the outcomes of their decisions were depicted as
losses rather than gains (conforming to general Prospect Theory), even
though they were essentially identical.201 The original Tversky and
198

FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 50
(2000), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10052.
199
See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1237-38 (2010) (describing American private and public law
approaches to determining what constitutes a reasonable person).
200
See supra note 57 (discussing framing effects).
201
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 57, at 453.
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Kahneman experiment related to expenditure on health measures in the
face of a deadly epidemic disease.202 It is not difficult to tweak this
experiment to address military necessity and collateral damage. Might
military commanders be susceptible to the same distortions of rationality?
And if so, what are the implications for international law? Should the
standard of “reasonable military commander” relating to proportionality in
targeting decisions take into account the ways in which reasonableness
diverges from perfect rationality?
Consider, for example, the following general design of an experiment,
closely following the Tversky and Kahneman framework. Two groups of
subjects would be presented with the following hypothetical:
Imagine that the enemy has stockpiled a significant quantity of
strategic munitions in the basement of an apartment building that
normally houses 200 civilians. As part of a military operation your
unit has been assigned the mission of eliminating this stockpile.
You have two alternative plans of action to choose from, both of
which will eliminate the munitions.
A first group of subjects would be posed with this question:
If plan A—a manned aerial attack—is adopted, 80 civilians will
survive. If plan B—an unmanned drone attack—is adopted, there is
1/3 probability that all civilians will survive, and 2/3 probability that
no civilians will survive.
A second group of subjects would be posed with what is in essence the same
scenario, but framed differently:
If plan A—a manned aerial attack—is adopted, 120 civilians will
die. If plan B—an unmanned drone attack—is adopted, there is 2/3
probability that all civilians will die, and 1/3 probability that no
civilians will die.
If the differential framing has the same effect in this IHL context as it has
elsewhere, we might hypothesize that the first group will prefer plan A,
whereas the second group will prefer plan B. An outcome like this would be
significant not only in the construction of the “reasonable military
commander” as a bounded rational actor, but could also contribute to the
design of military manuals. For example, the wording of guidelines matters
not only for interpretation but also for cognition. Moreover, an experiment
like this could test whether military commanders with different levels of
202
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experience and training have developed rationality that overcomes the
“trick” of framing effects by using different groups from among military
commanders and civilians as subjects. This is only an indicative
experiment.203 Many others could be constructed to test the rationality of
military commanders in different circumstances and in comparison with
other groups. Consider the following: subjects (playing the role of military
commanders or simply representatives of the general public) are presented
with two risky military operations. In scenario A, there is a 9/10 chance of
achieving a small military gain (1, on a scale of 1 to 10 representing the
absolute magnitude of a military gain), and a 1/10 chance of achieving
nothing from the operation. In scenario B, there is a 1/10 chance of gaining
a very significant military advantage (10 on the same scale) and a 1/10
chance of gaining nothing. Subjects would then be asked (a) which
alternative they would approve and (b) how much collateral damage would
be justified in each option (i.e., the “price” of the operation, which can,
under terms of proportionality, serve as a proxy for the expected military
advantage, all things considered). Similarly constructed experiments have
exposed the cognitive phenomenon of preference reversals: people may
prefer gamble A but place a higher price tag on gamble B.204 Which of
these calculi should be adopted as representative of a “reasonable military
commander?” Perhaps military commanders are less prone to this cognitive
weakness in rationality?
Another issue begging for behavioral analysis is the question of force
protection: to what extent should military forces take risks to prevent
civilian harm? And is the reduction of risk to one’s own forces a legitimate
factor in potentially increasing risk to civilians as part of the
proportionality calculus?205 The normative issues involved are absorbing,
203
I highlight here the advantages of experimental research, but this does not in any way
reduce the importance of field-based empirical research on similar topics. See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra
note 6, at 133-34 (describing an empirical methodology to study military planning’s relationship
with the proportionality principle, the minimization of the ratio of civilian to combatant
causalities inflicted in conflicts). Moreover, experimental research and field studies can be
mutually reinforcing, overcoming each other’s weaknesses.
204
See David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 623, 623 (1979) (describing an experiment showing that
although test subjects preferred one lottery over another, they tended to place a higher value on
the other, non-preferred lottery which had higher potential payouts but lower winning probability
than the preferred lottery); see also Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Introduction to THE
CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1, 20-22 (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006)
(providing an overview of various theories and explanations for preference reversal).
205
See, e.g., David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection (describing various approaches by
philosophers in evaluating the morality of increasing risk to civilians in order to reduce risk to
military forces), in READING WALZER 277, 287-90 (Yitzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2014).
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but no less intriguing would be a study from which we might gain an
understanding of how force protection factors into decisionmaking. In the
preference reversal example just discussed, we could, for example, replace
collateral damage with own-costs. But experiments taking into account all
three factors—military advantage, collateral damage, and own losses in
combat—could be designed. Thus, an experiment with relevant subjects
might pose the following question:
You are assessing the proportionality of an attack against key enemy
personnel. You may choose between two modes of attack: Option A
– aerial attack; and Option B – ground troop attack.
A first group would be given the following alternative outcomes (the
numbers expressing relative results on a scale of 1 to 10 reflecting the
severity of collateral damage and the military gain, respectively):
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10
A second group would be fed the following information:
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7;
Soldiers killed: 10
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10;
Soldiers killed: 4
And, finally, a third group would be presented with these options:
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7;
Soldiers killed: 4
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10;
Soldiers killed: 10
Here, the hypothesis, or rather, the examined element of bounded
rationality, would also be one of preference reversals. The relative
evaluation of two different alternatives is affected by an exogenous factor.
Note that all three groups are faced with the same outcomes in the strictest
terms of proportionality: the number of civilians killed compared to the
military advantage gained (i.e., without taking into account force protection
considerations). The only difference between the three groups is the degree
of harm caused to own forces. The first group has no data on this, the
second group faces moderate damage, and the third a very high degree of
harm. Moreover, Option B is clearly superior to Option A for all groups in
terms of proportionality. Nevertheless, one might hypothesize that subjects
in the third group would be put off by the high number of own casualties in
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Option B, preferring Option A and in essence reversing the preference. At
the very least, this would show us that force protection is de facto taken
into account as part of the proportionality calculus, with or without legal
basis. In short, it appears that behavioral and experimental analysis has
great potential to inform international humanitarian law, as well as other
areas of international law in which individuals are key decisionmakers, such
as international economic law and human rights.
CONCLUSION
The incorporation of insights from cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics into the study of international law is a difficult but necessary
next step in the evolution of a legal discipline. International law has, over
the last two decades, engaged with the ever-increasing complexity and
sophistication of other academic fields such as political science and
economics. This Article has endeavored to set out a general yet
comprehensive and systematic framework for taking that step, an
intellectual invitation to add behavioral analysis to the international legal
researcher’s toolbox.
We have seen that there are methodological challenges involved, as a
matter of course. Behavioral economics focuses on individual behavior,
whereas international law is the domain of states, peoples, organizations,
and other collectives, in addition to individuals. Behavioral economics is a
field immersed in experimental and empirical research, which can be
difficult, but very rewarding, to replicate in the international arena.
Behavioral analysis also lacks the neat parsimony of traditional rational
choice theorizing, which has gained a following among international legal
researchers. These challenges are not, however, weaknesses, but rather
strengths, as we struggle to better understand how international law works
and how it interacts with human behavior in different settings and
environments. As the examples in Part IV illustrate, there is much to study
through behavioral analysis at the state, group, and individual levels.
Theoretical applications, field studies, and experimental research are all
methodologies that can be brought to bear on behavioral international law,
in practically all subfields. Indeed, those examples—analysis of treaty
development, the role of dissent in international tribunals, and cognitive
biases in target selection in armed conflict—were of an almost minimal
nature. The menu of possible research avenues is huge, as is the potential
for gaining a richness and depth that currently only exists in a small, but
promising segment of empirical work relating to international law. Areas of
general concern—such as sources of international law, state responsibility,
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and enforcement—as well as a host of specialized issues—from the
structure of concessions in international agreements on trade in services to
derogations in human rights treaties—beckon for empirically grounded
behavioral research. Indeed, empiricism could benefit any area of
international law in which individual decisionmaking comes into play.
The challenge now is to design and execute rigorous empirical research
programs that can illuminate behavioral deviations from rationality in
decisionmaking that bear upon international legal problems, ideally through
intensive collaborations between researchers and scholars with
complementary training. However, as much as there is room for enthusiasm
toward the advent of behavioral international law, there is also a crucial
need to exercise caution and avoid any sweeping claims about international
law. To avoid the difficulties in gaining acceptance and legitimacy that other
theoretical approaches to international law (such as rational choice) have
faced, a behavioral approach to international law must be pursued with both
methodological meticulousness and intellectual humility.

